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. JCRISDICTIO~AL STATE.\ilE>iT 
Jurisdiction existed in the district court under Ctah Code ~ 78A-5-l 02( 1). 
Appeliatejurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)U). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
APPELLANT'S ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that Plaintiff Hilary 
"Skip" Wing was personally liable to Defendant Cathy Code under Utah's reciprocal 
attorney-fee statute(§ 78B-5-826) \'{here Skip was a party to the litigation as a 
representative only, where Skip was not a party to the contract with the attorney-fee 
provision, and where Skip could not have been awarded attorney fees personally? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE No. 1: A determination regarding whether § 
78B-5-826 applies to a request for attorney fees is a matter oflaw that appellate courts 
review for correctness. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 110, 160 P.3d 1041. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE No. 1: This issue was preserved below in Appellants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees (R. at 6340--43); 
Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Clarify Ruling and Order on the 
Parties' Motions for Attorney Fees (R. at 6780-89); and Appellants' Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Clarify Ruling and Order on the Parties' Motions for Attorney 
Fees (R. at 6810-16). 
b 
. ..) 
,..d 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATl.JTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of a real estate brokerage's attempt to collect a commission. 
The real estate brokerage consists of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy 
Corporation, and their principal broker Skip Wing. This brief refers to these entities as the 
Brokerage. The Brokerage sued Defendants/ Appellees Still Standing Stables LLC, Chuck 
Schvanev~ldt, and Cathy Code to collect a commission under a for-sale-by-owner 
commission agreement (FSBO). Code was dismissed from the case during trial, and was 
awarded attorney fees based on the FSBO's attorney-fee provision. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
This case has a long and complicated history, but the proceedings relevant to this 
appeal are actually very limited. 
In November, 2006, "Remax Elite" (a dba designation) filed a Petition seeking 
declaratory relief regarding a contract dispute and whether the buyer or seller was entitled 
to earnest money. R. at 1-4. Several counterclaims, third-party complaints, and other 
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pleadings followed. R. at 6732-44. The pleading relevant to this appeal originally 
appeared as Remax Elite suing Still Standing for a commission under the FSBO. R. at 
660-64. Eventually Chuck and Cathy were added as individual defendants. R. at 1232-
44. 
Immediately after it appeared that Remax Elite would be suing Still Standing, Still 
Standing began challenging Remax Elite's capacity to do so. R. at 591-605. Still 
Standing, and later Chuck and Cathy, argued that Remax Elite did not have standing to 
sue for two reasons: 1) under the law only Skip Wing as principal broker could bring the 
claim; and 2) Remax Elite cannot maintain an action because it is an expired dba. E.g., R. 
at 2070-105. 
The Defendants' persistence in using these standing arguments was beyond 
tenacious. From the initial Complaint until the Complaint was amended to list the 
Brokerage as a plaintiff, the Defendants filed at least: 
• 9 motions asserting that Remax Elite did not have standing (including 3 summary 
judgment motions); 
• 16 memoranda supporting those motions (including 4 "supplemental" and 1 
"additional" memoran~a for the same motion); and 
• 7 memoranda opposing actions taken by Remax Elite, asserting that Remax Elite 
could take no action at all because it was not a principal broker or was only an 
expired dba. 
R. at591-605;927-46; 1166-96; 1256-83; 1303-25; 1373-85; 1407-62; 1493-504; 
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1615-39; 1699-714~ 1715-25; 1829-68;2068-104;2120-36;2173-89;2289-98;2306-
14;2390--414;2417-18;2548-53;2614-22;2645-52;2653-60;3365-93. 
Approximately half of these filings occurred after the trial court's provisional 
J) ruling that Remax Elite had standing as a principal broker despite the expiration of the 
dba. R. at 1885-94. 
To stem the tide of repetitive motions on the already-decided standing issue, the 
Plaintiffs amended their Complaint so that the named ·plaintiffs were the Brokerage (i.e., 
Aspenwood Elite Legacy Corporation, Elite Legacy Corporation, and their principal 
broker). R. at 2324-27; 3591-603. Once the Brokerage was officially named as the party 
seeking a commission, Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy abandoned their standing 
..J arguments. R. at 7015. 
The case then proceeded to trial, where the jury found for the Brokerage in its 
commission claim against Chuck. R. at 5388-89. The Brokerage also received an award 
of attorney fees against Chuck under the FSBO's attorney-fee provision. Add. Ex. 1; R. at 
6770. 
Cathy, however, was dismissed from the case with prejudice. R. at 5423-25. After 
Cathy was dismissed, she moved the trial court for an award of attorney fees. R. at 5977-
6066. The trial court granted Cathy's motion, ruling that Cathy was a prevailing party 
under the FSBO and under Utah Code § 78B-5-826. Add. Ex. 1; R. at 6744-53. The trial 
court later ruled that the award was enforceable against Skip Wing personally, even 
though Skip never signed the FSBO and was never personally involved in this lawsuit. 
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Add. Ex. 2: R. at4481-82; 7009-11; 8246-47. 
After trial, Chuck submitted several motions, including a motion under Rule 52 to 
amend factual findings. R. at 6864-66; 6987-93; 7088-90; 7287-93; 8110-22. The trial 
court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part. R. at 8245-47. In its 
ruling, the court clarified four critical factual findings: 
• Skip Wing was identified in this case as a party, but not in his individual 
capacity; 
• to the extent that Skip is identified as a party in this case, that identification 
refers to Skip in his representative capacity; 
• Skip, in his individual capacity, did not have or bring any claims in this 
case; and 
• Skip was involved in this case only as an agent or representative of his 
brokerage. 
Add. Ex. 3; R. at 8246-4 7. Cathy has not appealed this ruling. 
On August 21, 2013, the Brokerage timely submitted a Notice of Appeal, asserting 
that the trial court erred by holding Skip Wing personally liable under the FSBO's 
attorney-fee provision. R. at 7220-22. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 20, 2006, Chuck Schvaneveldt entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner 
Commission Agreement (FSBO) with Tim Shea. Add. Ex. 4. Tim Shea signed the FSBO 
in his capacity as agent for "ReMax Elite." Id., § I. ReMax Elite is a dba designation that 
was used by the real estate brokerages Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite 
Legacy Corporation. See R. at 20-21; 2321; 2364-76. 
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The FSBO required the "Seller" to pay the Brokerage a commission if the Seller 
accepted an offer to buy an isolated property in Ogden owned by Still Standing. Add. Ex. 
4, § 2. "Seller" is defined in the FSBO as "Chuck and Cathy Code." Id, § 2. The FSBO 
.;;, also contains a reciprocal attorney-fee provision, awarding attorney fees to the prevailing 
party. Id.,§ 8. The FSBO does not mention Skip and Skip never signed it. Id. passim. 
Soon after Shea and Chuck signed the FSBO, Shea sent a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract to Chuck with an offer to purchase the property. Add. Ex. 5. Chuck signed the 
REPC and accepted the offer. Id. 
The deal did not go through because Chuck refused to provide a general warranty 
deed as required by the REPC. Add. Ex. 5, § 10; R. at 8389, pp. 8:4-7, 15:7-19, 20-
,d 21 :21-18, 41-42:24-8, 52-53:25-7. After the deal did not go through, litigation 
commenced and resulted in the award of attorney fees now before this Court. R. at 6744-
53. Throughout litigation, Skip maintained that he was involved in the litigation merely as 
a representative for his brokerage. R. at 7106-08; 8246-47; 8384 pp. 169-70, 182-83. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court interpreted Utah's reciprocal attorney-fee statute incorrectly. 
When a litigant is not a party to a contract, that litigant is liable under the 
..i reciprocal fee statute only if the litigant claimed to be a party to the contract. Skip is not a 
party to the FSBO and never claimed to be a party to the FSBO. Skip is not liable under 
the reciprocal fee statute and the trial court committed legal error by ruling that Skip is 
personally liable. 
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II. Skip cannot be personally liable in this litigation because he is involved in a 
representative capacity only. 
Under Utah law, representatives in litigation cannot be personally liable for 
attorney fees resulting from the litigation. The trial court expressly found, and the record 
reflects, that Skip was involved in this case as a representative or agent of a real estate 
brokerage, not as an individual. Nevertheless, the trial court held that Skip was personally 
liable for an award of attorney fees. The trial court's factual finding that Skip is involved 
in this case as a representative conflicts with the trial court's legal conclusion that Skip is 
personally liable for attorney fees. Where Skip was not personally involved in this 
lawsuit, it is reversible error to hold Skip personally liable. 
III. Skip cannot be liable under the contract if Skip cannot benefit from the 
contract. 
Under Utah law, Skip, as an agent of his brokerage, cannot enforce the FSBO for 
his own benefit. Skip will not and legally cannot receive any personal benefit from this 
lawsuit, including attorney fees. Holding Skip personally liable where he could not 
benefit personally is unjust. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SKIP WING CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE UNDER§ 78B-5-826. 
Skip Wing is not personally liable under the FSBO's contractual attorney-fee 
provision because Skip was not a party to the FSBO and never asserted that he was a 
party to it. Under Utah's reciprocal fee statute, litigants are liable for attorney fees only if 
they assert that they are a party to the contract upon which the litigation is based. 
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A. /11 Utah, contractual attorney-fee provisions apply to all parties to a 
contract. 
Utah Code § 78B-5-826 makes contractual attorney-fee provisions reciprocal: ';A 
court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based 
upon any ... written contract ... when the provisions of the ... written contract ... 
allow at least one party to recover attorney fees." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2015). 
This statute serves two purposes: First, it levels the playing field between parties to 
a contract of adhesion by eliminating the unequal allocation of litigation risk often found 
in such contracts. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 118, 160 P.3d 1041. Second, it 
eliminates situations where a party seeking to enforce a contract has a significant 
bargaining advantage over a party seeking to invalidate a contract; previously the party 
claiming enforcement could demand attorney fees if it prevailed, while the party seeking 
to invalidate could not. Id. 
Neither purpose is served by holding Skip Wing personally liable here. This case 
does not involve a contract of adhesion and Skip is not seeking to enforce a contract. 
Indeed, Utah case law clarifies that Skip-who is not even a party to the contract and has 
never claimed that he was-cannot be personally liable under § 78B-5-826. 
B. Under Utah law, a litigant that is not a party to a contract may be liable 
for contractual attorney fees 011/y if th at litigant claimed to be a party to 
the contract. 
§ 78B-5-826 does not apply to Skip. That statute applies only if a litigant's claim is 
based upon a written contract. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2015). An action is based 
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on a written contract when a litigant is a party to a contract or the litigant claims to be a 
party to a contract upon which litigation is based. Hooban v. Unicity Int'!, Inc., 2012 UT 
40, 132, 285 P.3d 766. 
The litigation in Hooban was based upon a distribution agreement between a 
multilevel marketer called Unicity and one ofUnicity's distributors. Id. ~1 1-6. The 
distribution agreement limited the distributor's right to transfer its interest in the 
distribution agreement by giving Unicity the right to purchase the agreement before it 
could be transferred. Id. , 4. 
Later the distributor declared bankruptcy. Id. 15. All the distributor's assets, 
including the distribution agreement, were sold to Mr. Hooban. Id. 
After purchasing the distribution agreement, Mr. Hooban sued Unicity, asserting 
that he was the distributor's successor in interest. Id. 115-6. Mr. Hooban sought to 
-
enforce the distribution agreement and to collect damages and attorney fees for Unicity's 
failure to honor the agreement. Id. 1 6. The distribution agreement provided that the 
prevailing party was entitled to an award of attorney fees. Id. 
The trial court granted Unicity's motion for summary judgment, holding that Mr. 
Hooban was not a party to the distribution agreement. Id. 1 7. The court then denied 
Unicity's motion for attorney fees under§ 78B-5-826, reasoning that because Mr. 
Hooban was not a party to the contract, he could not be bound by an attorney-fee 
provision in that contract. Id. 118-9. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on attorney 
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fees. Id. 1 10. The Utah Supreme Court affinned the Court of Appeals, and provided 
additional guidance concerning when § 78B-5-826 applies. Id. if1 15, 31-32. 
In reaching its decision, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the analysis for 
..J) determining whether litigation is based upon a contract as required by§ 78B-5-826. Id. 
The Court stated that Mr. Hooban's case was based upon a contract-even though Mr. 
Hooban was not a party to the contract-because Mr. Hooban had sought to establish that 
he was a party to that contract: 
A party is entitled to reciprocal fee-shifting by statute "when the 
provisions" of a contract would have entitled at least one party to recover its 
fees had that party prevailed "in a civil action based upon" the contract. 
That condition is met in this case because, had Hooban prevailed in this 
suit, he would have been a party to the contract upon which the suit is based 
and would have been contractually entitled to attorney fees. 
Id 132. 
In this case, unlike Mr. Hooban, Skip has never asserted that he was a party to a 
contract. Skip never signed the FSBO. He never asserted that he was a party to the FSBO, 
that he individually was entitled to enforce the FSBO, or that he individually should be 
awarded attorney fees under the FSBO. 
As a result, under the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Hooban, Skip has done 
nothing to trigger the reciprocal fee statute and that statute does not apply to him. This 
conclusion is further bolstered by a similar Utah case, Bushnell v. Barker, 2012 UT 20, 
274 P.3d 968. 
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C. The reciprocal fee statute applies only when a claim relies on establishing 
that a litigant is a party to a contract. 
Skip is not personally liable under the reciprocal fee statute because neither party 
attempted to establish that Skip was a party to the FSBO and because no claim relied on 
establishing that Skip was a party to the FSBO. When a claim does not seek to establish 
that a litigant is a party to a contract, the reciprocal attorney-fee statute does not apply 
against that litigant. Id. 1 13. 
In Bushnell, the client of an accounting firm sued the firm for breach of contract. 
Id. 112-3. The client also filed a third-party complaint against the firm's owner 
individually as the firm's alter ego. Id. ,r 3. The client's claim against the firm was 
successful, but the claim against the owner was dismissed. Id. ,r 4. 
After being dismissed, the owner moved for attorney fees under § 78B-5-826. Id. 
11 5-6. He claimed that while he was not a party to the contract, he would have been 
liable under the contract if the client's claim against him was successful. Id. 16. The trial 
court denied the motion. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed and held that neither party could 
have invoked § 78B-5-826 in the third-party complaint. Id. ,r 8. The Court of Appeals 
explained that § 78B-5-826 did not apply because the third-party complaint did not assert 
that the owner was a party to the contract. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: 
We agree with the court of appeals ... that [the client's] alter ego theory-
even if successful-would not have made [the owner] a defaulting party to 
11 
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the contract .... Thus~ [the owner] would not have been a defaulting party 
even if [the client] had prevailed, and the terms of the contract would not 
entitle at least one party to recover attorney fees in the sense required to 
trigger the statute. 
Id. ~ 13. 
In this case, like the client's claim against the owner in Bushnell, the Brokerage's 
claim did not and could not have made Skip a party to the contract. The Brokerage never 
even attempted to establish that Skip was a party to the FSBO. Indeed, attempting to do 
so would have been futile, as Skip is not mentioned in the FSBO and Skip never signed 
the FSBO. As a result, under Bushnell, Skip did not trigger the reciprocal fee statute 
because no result in this case would have established Skip as a party to the FSBO. 
In short, under Utah law the reciprocal fee statute applies to a litigant only if that 
litigant was a party to a contract or if a claim depended on establishing that the litigant 
was a party to a contract. Here Skip is not a party to the FSBO and no claim depended on 
establishing-or even attempted to establish-that Skip was a party to the FSBO. Thus 
Skip has not triggered the statute and it does not allow an attorney-fee award against him. 
As a result, the trial court committed reversible error by applying the reciprocal fee statute 
to Skip. This is especially true where Skip was never personally involved in this lawsuit. 
II. SKIP WING IS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE IN A REPRESENTATIVE 
CAPACITY ONLY. 
Skip cannot be personally liable for an award of attorney fees because Skip is not 
personally involved in this lawsuit. The true plaintiffs in this case are the real estate 
brokerages: Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation. Skip was 
12 
added to this litigation as a representative only. This is what the trial court found and this 
is clearly established in the record. 
A. If Skip is involved in litigation as a representative only, Skip cannot be 
personally liable for attorney fees. 
Representatives involved in litigation are not personally liable for attorney fees 
resulting from the litigation. See Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, 1 20, 221 P .3d 845 
(stating that trustees in representative capacities not personally liable for attorney fees). 
Thus, the trial court's factual finding that Skip is involved in this case as a 
representative conflicts with the trial court's legal conclusion that Skip is personally liable 
for attorney fees. Both of those things cannot be true. In this instance it is the trial court's 
legal conclusion that fails, because Skip is clearly involved in this litigation as a 
representative only. 
B. Both the record and the trial court's findings establish that Skip was not 
personally involved. 
Skip's involvement as a party in this litigation extended only to his role as a 
representative-Skip, individually, was simply never a plaintiff. The record makes this 
abundantly clear. Skip testified both in his deposition and at trial that he would not 
receive anything from this litigation even if the Brokerage prevailed: 
Q [Mr. Duncan]. Okay. So in this particular case, are you personally asking for 
any money, a~ Skip Wing? 
A [Mr. Wing]. Personally, as myself. No. There's-
Q. Okay. Are you asking for money as Skip Wing, as the broker and on behalf of 
the brokerage? 
A. Yes. 
13 
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R. at 8384, pp. 169-70. 
Q [Mr. Duncan]. [A]s Skip Wing, you, :Mr. Wing, married to your wife, not a 
principal broker, are you asking for anything in this case? 
A [Mr. Wing]. No. 
R. at 8384, p. 182. 
Q [Mr. Duncan]. As-as Rema"'<-as principal broker representing the underlying 
entity, are you seeking a commission for the brokerage? 
A [Mr. Wing]. Yes. 
R. at 8384, p. 183. 
Q [Mr. Fuller]. Do you claim that anything is due to you or payable to you related 
to this whole purchase agreement? 
A [Mr. Wing]. No. 
Q. You're not claiming a penny from this thing? 
A.No. 
R. at 7107-08. 
Q [Mr. Fuller]. Did you ever consider yourself as the owner, I own this dba 
ReMax Elite, I Skip Wing personally own it? 
A [Mr. Wing]. No. 
R. at 7106. 
The trial court agreed, finding that Skip was identified in the pleadings as a 
representative for a brokerage, not as an individual: 
[T]o the extent that Skip Wing is identified as a party in these proceedings, 
or as the holder of any claims, that identification is Mr. Skip Wing, in his 
representative capacity, as principal broker for the brokerage, or as an agent 
or representative of the brokerage, and does not represent his individual and 
personal ownership of those claims .... [T]o the extent that his name is 
included, that is a representation of his role in connection with the business 
entity, and that that role was the role of principal broker, representative, 
agent, or authorized representative of the brokerage. 
14 
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The trial court made this clarification '1o avoid any conclusion that the claims that 
are identified are individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing, independent of his role 
in connection with the business entity." R. at 8247. 
C. The trial court's findings reflect Utah law's preference for substance over 
form. 
Utah law prefers substance over form when evaluating pleadings and captions. 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275,279 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("We are 
controlled by substance, not captions.") (citing Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 657 
P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983)). 
By considering substance over form, courts ensure that claims are justly resolved 
on the merits while avoiding "gotcha" scenarios that unfairly punish litigants. See 
Barrientos v. Jones, 2012 UT 33, ,r 53,282 P.3d 50 (Lee, J., dissenting); Salcedo v. 
Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("[C]ourts will 
not allow the practice of the ... 1gotcha! 1 school of litigation to succeed."). 
If there is any doubt about whether Skip is involved in this litigation personally or 
as a representative, that doubt should be resolved in accordance with the substance of this 
case. The substance of this case is that Skip never stood to gain anything from this case 
personally, but was simply assisting his brokerage in recovering a commission due to the 
brokerage. In fact, Skip's role representing another entity in litigation is not uncommon. 
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D. Litigation often involves plaintiffs in a representative capacity. 
Situations like Skip· s are far from unique; plaintiffs often appear in litigation in a 
representative capacity. For example~ a litigant can bring an action as a representative of 
~ an LLC to enforce the LLC's rights. Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, 1 16, 
216 P.3d 944. If the representative prevails then the LLC-not the representative 
personally-reaps the benefits. And in such an action the LLC, not the representative, 
would be liable for attorney fees. 
Similarly, probate litigation often involves the personal representative of an estate 
as a plaintiff. See, e.g., Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 65 P.3d 1184. The personal 
representative is a named party, but has no individual rights or claims separate from the 
-.d estate. The personal representative recovers nothing for himself personally in estate 
litigation and likewise would not be personally liable for the estate's obligations. See 
Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305,120,221 P.3d 845 (stating that trustees are not 
personally liable in estate litigation). 
.,,I 
Such is the case here. Skip Wing is involved in this litigation in a representative 
capacity only. Like the representative parties in the examples above, Skip is not asserting 
his own rights, he will receive no benefit-including attorney fees-even though the 
Brokerage prevailed, and therefore he cannot be personally liable. 
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III. AS A lVIATTER OF LAW AND POLICY, SKIP IS NOT LIABLE UNDER 
THE FSBO IF HE CANNOT BENEFIT FROM THE FSBO. 
Skip should not be personally liable for attorney fees under the FSBO because 
Utah law does not allow Skip to seek attorney fees under the FSBO. Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 124, 100 P .3d 1200. 
A. Under Utah law, Skip cannot benefit from the FSBO. 
In Fericks, a seller and a potential buyer signed a REPC, with the seller 
represented by a real estate agent. Id. 13. The deal did not go through, and the potential 
buyer sued both the real estate agent and the seller. Id. 114-6. The real estate agent later 
argued for an award of attorney fees under the REPC, which contained an attorney-fee 
provision. Id. , 23. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the real estate agency could not enforce the 
REPC for the agency's own benefit. Id. 124. The Court explained that only a party to the 
contract-in other words, the seller, not the seller's agent-could reap the benefit of that 
contract: 
Id. 
[O]ne of the most basic principles of contract law is that, as a general rule, 
only parties to the contract may enforce the rights and obligations created 
by the contract. ... [A]n agency relationship with a principal to a contract 
does not give the agent the authority to enforce a contractual tenn for the 
agent's own benefit. 
Skip is like the real estate agency in Fericks. The real estate agency was only an 
agent. It could not enforce the REPC-including the attorney-fee provision-because the 
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REPC belonged to the agency's principal. Like the real estate agency, Skip is .only an 
agent. Skip cannot enforce the FSBO because the FSBO belongs to Skip's principal, the 
real estate brokerage. That means that Skip cannot enforce the attorney-fee provision for 
~ his own benefit. 
In contrast, Skip can enforce the contract, including the attorney-fee provision, for 
the benefit of his principals, Aspenwood and Elite Legacy. Aspenwood and Elite Legacy 
won an award of attorney fees against Chuck while Cathy won an award of attorney fees 
against Aspenwood and Elite Legacy. This result is fair because Aspen wood and Elite 
Legacy, not Skip, sought to enforce the FSBO. Skip's role enforcing the FSBO sought 
only to enforce the those entities' rights under the FSBO, not to enforce his own rights or 
...J even to establish that he had any rights under the FSBO. 
. ..) 
B. Skip was added to the case only to bolster Elite Legacy's and 
Aspenwood's claim to standing. 
It's unfair to hold Skip personally liable for attorney fees because Skip was added 
to this case only as a representative to ensure that his principals could claim standing. 
Under Utah law, only a principal broker may bring an action to recover a commission 
based on the sale of real estate. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-409(1) (2015). 1 Utah courts have 
impliedly held (and the trial court concluded) that a brokerage qualifies as a principal 
broker under§ 61-2f-409. R. at 1886-88; see also Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. 
Haus. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94 P.3d 292 (successful claim to recover a commission 
1 Formerly codified at§ 61-2-18. 
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with only brokerage named as plaintiff); C.J Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 7 58 P .2d 923 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ( claim for commission remanded with only brokerage named as plaintiff). 
This issue came up again and again in the trial court. Chuck, Cathy, and Still 
Standing filed numerous documents asserting that the named plaintiff, ReMax Elite ( a 
dba designation), did not have standing to recover a real estate commission. R. at 591-
605;927-46; 1166-96; 1256-83; 1303-25; 1373-85; 1407-62; 1493-504; 1615-39; 
1699-714; 1715-25. The trial court resolved this question through a provisional ruling 
stating that ReMax Elite did have standing. R. at 1886-88. Despite the trial court's 
provisional ruling, Chuck, Cathy, and Still Standing continued to file motions and 
memoranda based on the same lack-of-standing argument. R. at 1829-68; 2068-104; 
2120-36;2173-89;2289-98;2306-14;2390-414;2417-18;2548-53; 2614-22;2645-
52; 2653-60; 3365-93. This caused significant expense and delay. 
The Plaintiffs proposed, through a motion to for leave to amend, that it would be 
more efficient to simply add the real estate brokerages that had owned the name ReMax 
Elite to the case, thereby eliminating the drawn-out arguments over standing. R. at 2321. 
The trial court agreed, and suspended decision on the nine pending motions until the 
motion for leave to amend was decided. See R. at 2784-87. 
When the Plaintiffs amended their complaint, they added every party that could 
possibly be needed to give the real estate brokerages standing. This would ensure that 
Chuck, Cathy, and Still Standing would finally cease pursuing the already-decided 
standing issue. R. at 2324-27.The added plaintiffs were Aspenwood Real Estate 
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Corporation, Elite Legacy Corporation, and their principal broker Skip. R. at 3591-603. 
As explained in Section II, supra, Skip was not added in his individual capacity, but as a 
representative of Aspenwood and Elite Legacy. 
In other words, Skip was added only in his role as representative and only to 
solidify his principal's claim to standing. Where Skip's role in this litigation is limited to 
assisting his principal, it is unjust to hold Skip personally liable. 
C Holding Skip liable under the FSBO while he cannot benefit from the 
FSBO is unfair. 
Skip acknowledges that Cathy should receive an award of attorney fees. The FSBO 
expressly awards attorney fees to a prevailing party. Cathy was a prevailing party. Indeed, 
the trial court also awarded attorney fees to the Brokerage against Chuck under the same 
attorney-fee provision. Clearly it would be unfair to award attorney fees to the Brokerage 
while denying attorney fees to Cathy. 
On the other hand, it is just as unfair to hold Skip personally liable for attorney 
fees where Skip will not and never could have personally been awarded any attorney fees. 
The award of attorney fees against Chuck illustrates this point. The Brokerage has 
obtained an award of attorney fees against Chuck for approximately $150,000. R. at 6770. 
Skip, personally, will never collect a dime from this award; the award goes exclusively to 
Aspenwood and Elite Legacy. See Section II, Part B, supra. It is manifestly unjust to hold 
Skip personally liable under the reciprocal fee statute when Skip never could have 
benefitted from that statute personally. 
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D. As a matter of public policy, real estate brokers should not be personally 
liable when acting on a brokerage's behalf. 
Holding a broker personally liable under the circumstances in this case would have 
a chilling effect on real estate transactions. Concern over personal liability will prevent 
principal brokers from pursuing commission, which in turn will discourage principal 
brokers from entering into deals to begin with. This is especially true when the principal 
broker is not even a party to the contract and will not receive a commission under the 
contract. As a matter of public policy, this Court should not set the precedent that a 
principal broker representing his brokerage is personally liable for attorney fees under the 
brokerage's contract. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal could be resolved with a quick look at the For-Sale-By-Owner 
Commission Agreement. Skip Wing did not sign .it. No one ever claimed that he signed it. 
And no claim in this case depended on whether Skip signed it, was bound by it, or was 
entitled to enforce it. In this case Skip is merely representing a real estate brokerage. Skip 
has not and indeed under the law ca1mot benefit personally from the attomey-f ee 
provision central to this appeal. As a result, Skip has not triggered the reciprocal fee 
statute and enforcing that statute against him would be manifestly unjust. Skip 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling that Skip is personally 
liable for an award of attorney fees. 
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DATED and SIGNED this~ day of April, 2015. 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the fore going Brief of 
Appellant to be served via first class U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Karra J. Porter (#5223) 
Philip E. Lowry (#6603) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, Ste. 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Cathy Code, Defendant/ Appellee 
on this J_ day of April, 2015. 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P.24(f)(1) 
because it contains 5,501 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Utah R. 
-:J App. P.24(f)(l)(B). 
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b) 
because it has been prepared in a proportionally-spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 
2003 in Times New Roman, 13 size font. 
Dated: Qt.{ &( (t ) 
24 
) 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1: June 6, 2013 Ruling (Attorney Fees) 
EXHIBIT 2: July 22, 2013 Ruling (holding Skip Wing personally 
liable for attorney fee award) 
EXHIBIT 3: October 4, 2014 Ruling (trial court's finding that 
Skip Wing is not personally involved in the lawsuit) 
EXHIBIT 4: For-Sale-By-Owner Commission Agreement 
EXHIBIT 5: Real Estate Purchase Contract 
E XHIBIT l 
June 6, 201 3 Ruling (A ttorney Fees ) 
,u./i 
JUNO 6 20t3 
SECOND 
JUN O 6 2013 IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HILARY "SKIP" WING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER ON THE 
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Case No. 060906802 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Th.is matter is before the court on three separate issues: (1) D_efendants Still Standing 
Stables and Cathy Code's Memorandum of Costs; (2) Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for 
Attorney Fees; and (3) Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination and Award of Attorney Fees. Issues 
2 and 3 have been fully briefed and the court has heard evidence and oral argument. Plaintiffs 
failed to filed an objection to issue 1, but made oral arguments in opposition during a hearing on 
this matter. Pursuant to the following, each motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
Background 
This case started on November 17, 2006, when Petitioner ReMax Elite ("ReMax"), 
through its attorney Timothy Stewart of the firm Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford filed a 
Petition ("Original Petition") naming Still Standing Stables L.C. ("Seller" or "SSS") and Emmett 
Warren/Assign WBL Development LLC ("Buyer") as Respondents. The Original Petition 
sought declaratory relief regarding a contract dispute between Buyer and Seller in which ReMax 
was holding $25,000.00 earnest money and did not know to whom the money should be given. 
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The Original Petition states that ReMax was "willing to deliver the Earnest Money to such 
persons as the Court may direct, or to pay or deliver it over to the Court." There is no mention of 
a claim for a commission earned. Complaint/Interpleader at 110 (November 17, 2006). 
On January 5, 2008, Seller, through its attorney Nina Cleere, filed its answer, 
counterclaimed against ReMax, and filed a third-party complaint against Tim Shea ("Shea") 
asserting that it is entitled to the $25,000.00 earnest money because Buyer backed out of the Real 
Estate Purchase Agreement and "[Buyer was] in collusion with Tim Shea and/or Remax Elite to 
have the property recorded in [Buyer's] name without payment to [Seller] and that Remax Elite 
then refused to release the Earnest Money as required under the Purchase Agreement due to this 
collusive relationship .... " Answer/Counterclaim at 110 (January 5, 2007). 
On January 18, 2007, Buyer, through its attorney L. Miles LeBaron of the law finn 
Lebaron & Jensen, P.C., filed its answer, crossclaimed against Seller, and filed a third-party 
complaint against Seller's principal Chuck Schvaneveldt ("Schvaneveldt"). Buyer's complaint 
alleged seven causes of action each relying on the assertion that Seller breached the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract by misrepresenting that the property included an easement which provided 
access to the property, failing to provide a "standard owner's policy of title insurance," and 
failing to provide a warranty deed. Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint at 1127-29 
(January 18, 2007). 
On February 7, 2007, Attorney Robert Fuller ("Fuller") entered his appearance as counsel 
for Seller and Schvaneveldt. Notice of Appearance (February 7, 2007).1 On April 16, 2007, 
Fuller filed Seller's and Schvaneveldt's "First Amended Counterclaim and Third-party 
1 Nina Cleere never filed a Notice of Withdrawal, but, as far as the court is aware, she has not been involved in this 
case since she filed Seller's January 5, 2007, "Answer/Counterclaim." 
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Complaint" to specifically include claims of Negligent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract 
against ReMax and Shea. "First Amended Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint" (April 16, 
2007). 
On April 24, 2007, Buyers amended their "Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint." 
There were not any substantive changes. Amended Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party 
Complaint (April 24, 2007). 
On May I 4, 2007, both ReMax and Shea, through attorney Robert Wallace ("Wallace") 
of the law firm Kirton & McConkie, filed their Answers to Seller's and Schvaneveldt's "First 
Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint." Answer ofReMax Elite to The 
Counterclaim of Still Standing Stables, L.C. and Chuck Schvaneveldt (May 14, 2007) and 
Answer of Tim Shea to the Third Party Complaint of Still Standing Stables, L.C. and Chuck 
Schvaneveldt (May 14, 2007). 
After these pleadings, Buyer and Seller conducted discovery and negotiated settlement. 
ReMax and Shea also participated in discovery. On March 21, 2008, Buyer and Seller filed a 
stipulated motion to dismiss the claims between Buyer and Seller, which the court granted on 
March 31, 2008. Seller's and Schvaneveldt's claims against ReMax and Shea survived. All 
other claims were dismissed. Order on Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Claims Between Buyer and 
Seller (March 31, 2008). 
On June 9, 2008, ReMax and Shea, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed a "Motion for Leave 
to Amend" the November 17, 2006, Original Petition arguing that "ReMax and Timothy Shea .. 
. have claims against [Seller] that they would like to join in this action regarding a sales 
commission that was never paid to them after bringing a ready, able and willing buyer to 
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Defendant [Seller]." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 (June 9, 
2008). ReMax and Shea justified their delay in bring this claim stating: 
... [T]hey originally hoped that [Seller] and [Buyer] would settle this case and 
that ReMax and Shea could just move on with life. This is primarily because the 
insurance provider for ReMax Elite and Shea only provides representation for 
defensive claims and not for ReMax Elite and Shea's offensive claims. ReMax 
and Shea were hoping to avoid litigation because when the complaint was 
originally filed they did not want to commit the financial resources to obtain 
counsel as they perceived this fight to be between [Seller] and [Buyer). Since that 
time, the above parties reached a settlement, but [Seller] has continued to pursue 
its claims against ReMax and Shea. In addition, ReMax and Shea have reached 
an agreement with counsel and are being represented in their offensive claims by 
LeBaron & Jensen, L.C. 
Id. at 2-3. Despite the fact that the Motion to Amend was brought by both ReMax and Shea, the 
proposed Amended Complaint attached to the motion only named Shea as a plaintiff. 
Sellers opposed the amendment for several reasons. Two of its principal reasons were (1) 
under Utah law, Shea was not allowed to advance a claim for a real estate commission, and (2) 
LeBaron & Jensen could not represent ReMax or Shea in pursuing the commission because they 
had previously represented Buyer. Memorandum in Opposition to ReMax and Tim Shea's 
Motion for Leave to Amend at 2 & 7 (June 23, 2008). 
On September 2, 2008, the court granted ReMax's and Shea's Motion to Amend. The 
court, however, did not allow adoption of the proposed amended complaint that had been 
attached to the memorandum in support because the court agreed with Seller that Shea could not 
bring a claim for the commission in his own name. Instead, the court instructed: "[I]f Remax 
wishes to file its own counterclaim to collect the commission, it may do so." Ruling Granting 
Motion For Leave to Amend" at 4-5 (September 2, 2008). The court did not accept Seller's 
argument that there was a conflict of interest between LeBaron & Jensen representing ReMax 
i~ 
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and Shea and its previous representation ofBuyer.2 At this point LeBaron & Jensen began 
representing ReMax in its claim to obtain the commission. Attorney Wallace continued to 
represent both ReMax and Shea in defending Seller's claims against them. 
On September 10, 2008, ReMax, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed an Amended 
Complaint stating three causes of action against Seller seeking the commission. Amended 
Complaint (September 10, 2008). Shea's name does not appear on the Amended Complaint. Id. 
Seller did not immediately answer the Amended Complaint, and ReMax brought a 
Motion to Compel Answers. Ultimately, on February 6, 2009, Seller filed "Seller's Answer to 
ReMax Elite's Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint." 
Seller, having already asserted its claims against ReMax and Shea in its previous "First 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint," did not reassert its claims against ReMax 
and Shea. It did, however, add "the Principal Broker and Remax owner's group ... as additional 
Third-Party Defendants." Seller's Answer to ReMax Elite's Amended Complaint and Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint at 3 (February 6, 2009). This is the first time that 
Hilary "Skip" Wing's name appears on any pleadings. 
On June 23, 2009, Attorney Wallace, ReMax and Shea's defense counsel, filed a Motion 
to Strike Seller's Amended Third-Party Complaint because it added new third-party defendants 
without obtaining leave from the court. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Still 
Standing Stables' Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint" (June 23, 2009). The 
Motion was briefed, but was never submitted for decision. 
2 No party raised any potential conflict of interest issue concerning joint representation of Shea and ReMax at this 
time. 
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On June 1, 2009, ReMax and Shea filed a "Second Motion for Leave to Amend" their 
complaint. This time they desired to add Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code (''Code") as Defendants. 
ReMax and Shea argued that during the course of discovery they learned new information 
concerning Schvaneveldt's and Code's signatures on the For Sale By Owner Commission 
Agreement that justified adding them as parties. Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for 
Leave to Amend at 2-4 (June 1, 2009). Seller opposed the motion, arguing that it was untimely, 
that it attempted to make individual representatives of an LLC personally liable for the claim, 
and that ReMax, as a defunct dba, did not have standing to sue for a commission claim. 
Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion for Leave to Amend (June 23, 2009). 
On June 12, 2009, Timothy Stewart filed a Notice of Withdrawal from representing 
ReMax. This Notice appears to be a mere formality as all ofReMax's filings after the Original 
Petition were submitted by either Attorney Wallace or LeBaron & Jensen. 
On August 12, 2009, the court granted ReMax and Shea's Second Motion for Leave to 
Amend. The court, however, did not allow Shea to assert a claim for the real estate commission 
or allow ReMax's claim for quantum meruit. Ruling Granting Second Motion for Leave to 
Amend (August 12, 2009). Wallace and LeBaron & Jensen filed the "Second Amended Answer 
and Counterclaim of Timothy Shea ... and Third Party Complaint Against Cathy Code" 
("Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim") adding Schvaneveldt and Code as defendants on 
September 10, 2009. Despite the court's plain direction to the contrary, the complaint was 
brought in Shea's and ReMax's name and asserted a claim for quantum meruit. It is ambiguous 
whether ReMax was included on the claim of breach of contract for the real estate commission 
because page 9 paragraph 10 does not assert the cause of action on ReMax's behalf, but page 9 
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paragraph 9 refers to the commission as "their commission,,, referring to both ReMax and Shea. 
Second Amended Answer (September 10, 2009). This is the first time that ReMax or Shea filed 
any claim against Schvaneveldt and the first time Code appeared as a party in any respect. 3 On 
October 8, 2009, the Second Amended Answer was served on Schvaneveldt and Code. Return of 
Service (October 16, 2009). 
On October 13, 2009, Seller, through Attorney Fuller, filed its answer to ReMax and 
Shea's Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim and moved to strike portions of the 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against Cathy Code. The Motion to Strike asserted 
multiple reasons to strike the complaint, including an argument that ReMax and Shea violated 
the court's order not to include any claims by Shea and not to include a claim for quantum 
meruit. :on October 30, 2009, Schvaneveldt filed his own answer and joined Seller's Motion to 
Strike. 'On November 5, 2009, Code, through her attorneys Robert Sykes ("Sykes") and Allison 
Carter ("Carter"), filed her Answer to ReMax's Third-Party Complaint. This was the first action 
by Code in this case. 
On January 19, 2010, the court issued an order rejecting all of Seller's and 
Schvaneveldt's arguments asserted in their Motion to Strike, but also stated: "The Court has· 
already ruled that [Shea's claim for a commission and the claim for quantum meruit] are futile, 
and they have been stricken. No further action by the Cowi is necessary." Ruling Denying 
Motion to Strike (January 19, 2010). 
Sykes and Carter, along with other employees of Sykes' firm, represented Code until she 
terminated them in July 2010. During that time Sykes filed Code's Answer, drafted and argued a 
3 Buyer had previously brought a third-party complaint against Schvaneveldt, but those claims were dismissed as 
part of the March 31, 2008 "Order on Stipulated Motion to Dismiss Claims Between Buyer and Seller." 
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rule 56(f) motion in response to ReMax's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, conducted 
discovery, and monitored the progress of the case as advanced by Seller and Schvaneveldt's 
counsel, Fuller. 
On July 12, 2010, after Code discharged Sykes, William 0. Kimball ("Kimball"), an in-
house attorney for Stake Center Locating. Inc., a company in which Schvaneveldt owns a fifty 
percent interest, filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for Code. He brought himself up to 
speed on the case, and on September 3, 2010, Code moved for summary judgment on the issue of 
attorney fees related to Shea's claim against Code. Memorandum in Support of Cathy Code's 
Motion for Summary Judgment for Attorney Fees Against Timothy Shea (September 3, 2010). 
Code relied on Shea's admission in his responses to her First Request For Admissions to 
establish that Shea had sued her on or about September 8, 2009, for recovery of a commission 
owed under a For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement which contained a provision for 
attorney fees to the prevailing party of any action or proceeding arising out of the agreement.4 
Code argued that Shea's claims against Code had been dismissed in a ruling dated August 12, 
2010. 
On September 7, 2010, Shea, through LeBaron & Jensen, filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees. Shea did not dispute that he 
had sued Code for a commission or that the court had ruled on August 12, 2010, that he could 
not recover a commission. Rather, Shea argued that he was not a party to the contract. 
On November 1, 2010, the court issued an "Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's 
Motion for Attorney Fees." The court, reciting the background of the issue, stated: 
4 Code's Request for Admissions states: "Request 2: Admit that you sued Cathy Code on or about September 8, 
2009. Request 2. Admit." 
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In September of 2009, Shea and Remax filed a third-party complaint, asserting 
four causes of action against Code arising from the commission agreement .... 
The breach of contract claim was brought solely by Shea, while the other three 
claims were brought jointly by Shea and Remax. Though Remax's claims still 
remain, all four of the claims brought by Shea were dismissed through summary 
judgment. Code then filed her motion for attorney fees. 
Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees at 2 (November 1, 2010). 
The court then proceeded to evaluate the motion for attorney fees and because it had difficulty 
understanding guidance provided by Hooban v. Unicity Jnt'l, Inc., 220 P.3d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009), cert. granted, 225 P.3d 880 (Utah 2010), the court acknowledged that it was unsure how 
to proceed.5 Ultimately, the court ruled: 
If the parties feel they can provide the Court with additional insight, they are 
encouraged to further brief the narrow issue of how the court should exercise its 
discretion in this motion, once this case has reached a final resolution. If the 
parties choose not to brief this issue further, the Court will take the position that 
. ~emotion for attorney fees is denied. 
Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees at 5. Code never 
submitted any supplemental memoranda on this particular motion, and the matter was never 
resubmitted for decision. 
On December 13, 2010, Code, through Attorney Kimball, again moved for an award of 
Attorney Fees against Shea pursuant to the bad faith statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-825. 
Memorandum in Support of Cathy Code's Motion for Summary Judgment for Attorney Fees in 
Accordance with U.C.A. § 78B-5-825 (December 13, 2010). Code argued that Shea had filed his 
claims against her in bad faith because he had knowledge that they were meritless when the court 
told him_ so in its September 8, 2008 ruling, among other factors. On January 7,201 I, there were 
5 Hooban has since been reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision is much clearer 
concerning the issues raised by Code's claim for Attorney Fees. 
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nine motions awaiting decision by the court including ReMax's "Third Motion to Amend" and 
Code's motion for attorney fees. The court ordered that it would 
not rule on any of the pending motions until a request to submit for decision is 
filed on ReMax's motion to amend and the Court has issued its ruling on that 
motion .... [I]f any party determines that any of the remaining motions 
necessitates a ruling from the Court, that party must file a new request to submit 
for decision. 
Order at 3 (January 7, 2011). Code objected to the November 7, 2011 ruling, arguing that her 
second motion for fees was ripe for decision but did not file a new request to submit. Cathy 
Code's Objection to This Court's Order Dated January 7, 2011 (January 18,2011). 
On December 7, 2010, ReMax filed its "Third Motion to Amend" its complaint. ReMax 
argued that Defendants had repeatedly asserted that it did not have standing to bring the claims 
against them, and "[ w ]hile these particular motions are not well taken, the Plaintiff requests that 
this Court allow the plaintiff to amend to cut off the incessant-filing of memoranda and motions 
about this issue that have bogged this case down." Memorandum in Support of Third Motion for 
Leave to Amend at 2 (December 7, 2010). On December 17, 2010, the court granted Seller's 
motion to enforce a mandatory dispute resolution agreement. Ruling Granting Defendant's 
Motion to Enforce Mandatory Dispute Resolution Agreement (December 17, 2010). This ruling, 
along with a stay of proceedings to deal with Shea's pending bankruptcy, caused a delay in 
proceedings for nearly two years. Ultimately, the matter ofReMax's Third Motion to Amend 
came before the court in a January 27, 2012 hearing. The court granted the motion to amend, 
and ReMax filed its "Tirird Amended Answer and Counter Claim of Timothy Shea ... and Third 
Party Complaint Against Code" on January 31, 2012. Despite the title of the document, Shea did 
not reassert any counterclaims. All of the counterclaims were brought by "Elite Legacy 
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Corporation D/B/ A ReMax Elite, Aspenwood Real Estate Corpoartion D/B/A Re/Max Elite, and 
Hilary Owen "Skip" Wing, principal broker D/B/ A as Re/Max Elite .... " The complaint again 
brought a claim for Unjust Enrichment/Quantum Mernit, which the court had previously 
dismissed. 
Over the next year, there were various motions for summary judgment and other matters. 
These motions narrowed the issues to be presented at trial. Kimball eventually stopped 
representing Code, but never filed a notice of withdrawal. Accordingly, it is unclear when his 
representation stopped. The last memorandum that Kimball filed with the court was a March 28, 
2011 "Memorandum in Opposition to [Plaintiffs] Motion for Protective Order." The last 
hearing he participated in was a September 27, 2011 telephone conference. Around September 
2011, Attorney Kenneth Childs ("Childs") began representing Code. Affadavit of Kenneth P. 
Childs {February 27, 2013). Childs is also in-house counsel for Stake Center Locating. Inc. His 
affidavit reflects that he spent significant time reviewing the case and helped Fuller prepare for 
trial, do legal research, and strategize. Child's affidavit attributes 63.5 of the 104.75 hours that 
he worked on the case to defending Code. Beginning in 2012, it appears that Fuller began 
representing Code because from February 2012 until the trial in August 2012 Fuller filed several 
motions on behalf of Seller, Schvaneveldt, and Code. Code's current motion for attorney fees, 
however, does not request any of Fuller's fees. 
On May 22, 2012, the court granted ReMax's and the remaining Counterclaim 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Still Standing Stables' claims 
against them. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (May 22, 2012). On July 17, 2012, the 
court declined to reconsider the dismissal ~d indicated that the ruling also applied to 
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Schvaneveldt's and Code's Third Party Complaints which they tried to add by amendment. 
Rulings and Order on Pending Motions (July 17, 2012). 
About two weeks before the August 2012 trial, Attorney Scott Edgar ("Edgar") joined as 
counsel for Code and worked with Fuller and Childs throughout the trial. Defendant Cathy 
Code's Combined Motion and Memorandum in support of Motion for Attorney Fees at Exhibit 8 
(January 2, 2013). 
On August 3, 2012, the parties met for a pretrial conference. For reasons the court cannot 
recall at this time, the claims against Still Standing Stables were released. Order Dismissing 
Defendant Still Standing Stable, L.C. with Prejudice (October 3, 2012). Accordingly, at the time 
of trial, only ReMax's claims against Chuck Schvenaveldt and Cathy Code survived. The jury 
trial was held on August 6, 7, 8, and 10. At the close of Plaintiffs case, Code moved for a 
directed verdict, which the court later granted. Order Dismissing Cathy Code With Prejudice 
(August 24, 2012). The jury found Schvaneveldt liable for ReMax's commission, but in 
response to the special verdict form's request for a detennination of damages entered judgment 
in an amount incongruous with the contract. 
After the trial both ReMax and Schvaneveldt moved for a new trial. On February 28, 
2013, the court denied Schvaneveldt's Motion for New Trial. Ruling Denying Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial (February 28, 2013). That ruling was reaffirmed on May 16, 2013. Ruling 
and Order on Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion fro New Trial and Motion to Strike (May 16, 2013). 
On December 21, 2012, instead of granting a new trial to Plaintiff on the issue of damages, the 
court found that the jury's damage award was inconsistent with the jury's answers to the 
interrogatories contained on the special verdict form. Accordingly, the court "enter[ed] 
RULING AND ORDER ON CHUCK SCHY ANEVELDT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION' TO 
STRIKE . 
Case No. 060906802 
Page 13 of40 
judgment in accordance with the jury's answers to the interrogatories notwithstanding the jury's 
inconsistent damages award." Order and Judgment on Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial 
(December 21, 2012). 
On November 30, 2012, ReMax filed the instant Motion for a Detennination of Attorney 
Fees, and on January 3, 2013, Code filed her Motion for Attorney Fees. ReMax, Code, and Still 
Standing Stables have also asserted that they are entitled to an award of costs. 
Code's Motion for Attorney Fees 
Having prevailed in her defense of Plaintiffs' claims against her, Code now claims that, 
pursuant to the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement's attorney fees provision, she is 
entitled to an award of $83,375 in attorney fees from "plaintiffs, Tim Shea, Hilary 'Skip' Wing, 
dba ReMax Elite, Elite Legacy Corp., dba ReMax Elite and Aspenwood Real Estate Corp., dba 
ReMax Elite .... " During the course of this litigation, Code was represented by four different 
attorneys: Sykes, Kimball, Childs, and Edgar. Fuller filed some motions on Code's behalf, but is 
not clai:m,ing that he ever represented her. Code has submitted affidavits by each attorney 
detailing their fees charged for their services. 
At the outset, the court notes that despite some confusion by all of the parties to this 
proceeding, Shea never filed any complaints against Code that became an official part of the 
record. Shea's claims contained in his September 10, 2009 Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim against Cathy Code were stricken. This court confirmed the nullity of these 
alleged claims both when it granted Shea's Second Motion to Amend and when SSS moved to 
strike their inclusion in Shea's Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Because Shea never 
filed any claims against Code, Code cannot recover any attorney fees from him. 
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With respect to the other plaintiffs, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil 
action based upon any ... written contract ... when the provisions of the ... 
written contract ... allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
Here, ReMax filed a claim against Code seeking a commission based on the For Sale By 
Owner Commission Agreement, which contained a provision providing for an award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party for any action brought to enforce the agreement. Accordingly, Code, 
as the prevailing party, is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney fees. Hooban v. 
Unicity Intl., Inc., 285 P.3d 766 (Utah 2012). To the extent that Code's counterclaims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and other torts were dismissed, the court does not see 
that any of the fees requested by Code pertain to those claims. 
Having determined that Code is a prevailing party entitled to a reasonable and necessary 
attorney fee, the court must analyze the affidavits and testimony provided by Code's attorneys to 
determine if their fees are reasonable and necessary. Some principles that the court will follow 
include: (I) A client has the right to discharge and hire as many lawyers she deems necessary at 
her own discretion. An opposing third party, however, cannot reasonably be expected to pay for 
a new attorney to rehash old ground every time a new attorney is hired. (2) During the course of 
litigation, attorneys spend time discussing administrative details of the case, such as in a firm 
meeting. Some of this discussion is properly billable. However, to the extent that attorneys 
repeatedly engage in meetings which discuss attorney client relationships or other administrative 
matters, an opposing third party should not be required to pay for those fees. (3) The burden is on 
the party seeking attorney fees to show that the fees are reasonable and necessary. To the extent 
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that attorneys' affidavits and testimony fail to clarify what they are billing for, the court will not 
allow an award of those fees. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P .2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988), the Court listed four 
questions that should be answered when detennining the reasonableness of an attorney fee. 
Those factors are: (1) what legal work was actually performed; (2) how much of the work 
performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter; (3) is the attorney's 
billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services; and 
( 4) are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors. Id. 
The court will review each of Code's Attorneys' requested fees in tum. 
A. Attorney Robert B. Sykes & Associates 
Attorney Robert Sykes has practiced law in Utah since 1974, and has appeared before 
this court on numerous occasions. At the time that he worked on Code's case, his billing rate 
was $350.00 per hour. Although the court feels this rate is a little high for the local legal 
community, it cannot find that the fee is unreasonable. 
Sykes' associate Alyson Carter is a young attorney with a few years experience in 
complex litigation. At the time she worked on Code's case, her billing rate was $225.00 per 
hour. The court finds that this rate is typical of attorneys with similar experience and training in 
this legal market and is reasonable. 
Sykes' associate Scott Edgar is a young attorney that from the court's own observations 
performed well in his representation of Code. At the time he worked on Code's case, as an 
associate for Sykes, his billing rate was $175.00 per hour. The court finds that this rate is typical 
of attorneys with similar experience and training in this legal market and is reasonable 
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On May 10, 2013, Sykes testified regarding his time expended representing Code. 
During the hearing, Sykes provided the court with a "Statement of Costs," dated May 13, 2013.6 
This document was received and considered during the evidentiary hearing on fees, and is hereby 
made a part of the record. 
· With respect to page 1 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs," the court makes the 
following findings: First, Sykes was the first attorney to represent Code. Accordingly, the court 
will allow recovery of fees for time spent reviewing the case in order to gain an understanding of 
its history. Second, the court will not allow recovery for time spent related to a motion to 
dismiss that was not ultimately filed. Indeed, the court finds that Sykes was confused regarding 
the purpose of the alleged motion to dismiss and could not clearly remember working on it. 
Third, the court will not allow recovery of fees for time discussing the case, without more detail 
provided. It is this court's judgment that such discussions are most likely administrative in 
nature; it is not reasonable to expect an opposing party to pay for them without greater detail 
concerning the purpose of the discussion. 
Following the principles outlined above, the court will allow an award of all of Sykes' 
fees listed on page 1 of3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs" except the following: (1) "10/20/2009 
RB Sykes Discuss in firm meeting 0.10"; (2) "01/12/2010 RB Sykes Discuss in firm meeting 
0.10"; (3) "01/29/2010 Paralegal VAD-Drafting Mand MM to Dismiss as to Code 0.80"; (4) 
"02/17/2010 Read various documents, including potential motion to dismiss, docket from the 
court, etc. 0.50"; (5) "02/23/2010 RB Sykes Review status in firm meeting 0.10"; and ( 6) 
"05/04/2010 RB Sykes Discuss in firm meeting 0.10." 
6 Although Sykes' Statement of Costs is dated after the May 10, 2013 hearing, the court did receive it during the 
hearing and consider it. 
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With respect to page 2 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs," the court makes the 
following findings: First, from June 9, 2010, to June 15, 2010, Sykes and Edgar worked on 
briefing a supplemental memorandum to SSS's Motion for Summary Judgment on \he Issue of 
Commission Countercla~ms, which Code had previously joined. The court permitted this 
briefing in its May 27, 2010 hearing when it granted Code's rule 56(f) motion. Given that this 
was Code's first attempt to have the case dismissed on the theory that ReMax lacked standing, 
the court finds that it was reasonable and necessary. Despite the fact that Code ultimately lost 
this motion, it helped to narrow the legal issues in dispute. Second, on July 2, 2010, Sykes billed 
five and a half hours to attend a deposition conducted by his associate Scott Edgar. During the 
May 10;2013 hearing, Sykes testified that he participated to help train Edgar. The Court will not 
allow an.award of fees for time spent training Sykes' associate. 
·,Following the principles outlined above, the court will allow an award of all of Sykes' 
fees listed on page 2 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs" except the following: (1) "06/02/201 
RB Sykes Review bill. Make changes. Discuss in firm meeting 0.10"; (2) "06/16/2010 SR Edgar 
TC to Fuller re Quinney and legal strategies to possibly sue for bringing action w/out merit"; (2) 
"06/22/2010 RB Sykes Discuss case in firm meeting. 0.10"; (3) "06/24/2010 RB Sykes TC Bill 
Kimball re status. 0.20"; (4) "06/29/2010 SR Edgar discuss strategy in Litstat 0.10"; and (5), 
07/02/2010 RB Sykes Attend Scott Quinney deposition. Attend Tim-Shea deposition. Meet 
w/Counsel to discuss strategy." 
With respect to page 3 of 3 of Sykes' "Statement of Costs," the court makes the 
following finding: on July 8, 2010, Sykes worked on dictating a "lengthy letter providing status 
of the case" because Code had terminated Sykes' representation of her. It is certainly 
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appropriate as an act of professionalism for Sykes to help ease the transition be1:\.veen himself and 
new counsel. It is not, however, reasonable to expect an opposing party to pay the fees 
associated with Code's choice to change counsel; that financial burdem should remain with 
Code. Accordingly, because all of the fees listed on page 3 of 3 are related to this transition, the 
court will not allow Code to recover them. 
Having reviewed all of the billing in Sykes' "Statement of Costs," and accounting for the 
above deductions, the court orders that to the extent Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks 
compensation for the representation of Robert B. Sykes & Associates, Code may recover 
attorney fees in the amount of $21,135.50. 
Sykes' "Statement of Costs" also includes $251.87 in costs for copies, faxes, and travel. 
These costs are expenses that are "ever so necessary, but are nonetheless not properly taxable as 
costs." .Youngv. State, 16 P.3d 549,554 (Utah 2000). Accordingly, Code cannot recover these 
costs. 
B. Attorney William Kimball 
Attorney William Kimball is an experienced attorney who is in-house counsel for Stake 
Center Locating, Inc., which is a company in which Schvaneveldt, Code's husband, owns a fifty 
percent interest. Kimball testified that his billing rate was $200.00 per hour, but also provided a 
"cost-plus rate" of$156.73 per hour. The court finds that a client is not permitted to recover a 
billable rate is accordance with the legal market for representation by in-house counsel. 
Softsolutions, Inc., v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46. Accordingly, to the extent Code can 
recover her fees for Kimball's representation, that fee shall be calculated according to the cost-
[•. 
\liil 
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plus rate provided. Further, the Court finds that $156.73 per hour is a reasonable rate for in-
house counsel in the local legal market for an attorney of Kimball's experience. 
On December 10, 2010, Kimball filed an affidavit listing his hours worked in 
representing Code. That affidavit was submitted in support of Code's second motion for 
attorney fees, which this court never issued a ruling on. On May 10, 2013, Kimball submitted 
another affidavit setting forth his cost-plus rate and stating that there was an "Exhibit A" 
attached that reflects the time he spent working on Code's case. The court, however, has been 
unable to locate any exhibit attached to Kimball's May affidavit. Given that the May 10, 2013 
affidavit requests $14,536.70 in attorney fees, i.e., compensation for 92.75 hours oflegal work, 
and the December 10, 2010 affidavit also requests compensation for 92.75 hours oflegal work, 
the court'finds that the information listed in the December 10, 2010 affidavit is the same 
information which Kimball intended to attach to his May 10, 2013 affidavit. This finding is 
supported by Kimball's references to the document during his May 10, 2013 testimony. 
Kimball's affidavit reflects that he spent 92.75 working for Code. This time was spent 
almost entirely on three motions: (1) Code's first Motion for Attorney Fees against Shea, (2) 
Code's opposition to a Motion to Strike a portion of his Reply in Support of Code's Motion for 
Attorney Fees, and (3) Code's second Motion for Attorney Fees against Shea. In short, Kimball 
did nothing but attempt to recover Code's fees for a claim that Shea filed against her. 
Shea never filed any claims against Code. Although the Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim served on Code technically asserted claims by Shea against Code, the court struck 
those claims from the beginning. As noted above, on January 19, 2010, this court denied Seller's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim stating: "The Court has 
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already ruled that [Shea's claim for a commission is] futile, and they have been stricken. No 
further action by the Court is necessary." (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the court erred in 
accepting Code and Shea's representations that Shea had filed a claim against Code when it 
issued its November 1, 2010 "Interim Ruling on Defendant Cathy Code's [First] Motion for 
Attorney Fees." Indeed, Code should have known that the court had previously stricken Shea's 
complaints against her a mere two months after she filed her answer, and, arguably, should have 
known that they were stricken when the court denied Shea's attempts to have them added in the 
"Second Motion to Amend." 
Accordingly, Kimball's motions for attorney fees against Shea were completely without 
merit and unnecessary. For this reason, to the extent that Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks 
compensation for fees incurred during Kimball's representation, Code's Motion is denied. 
C. Attorney Kenneth Craig 
Attorney Kenneth Craig, like Kimball, is in-house counsel for Stake Center Locating, Inc. 
Accordingly, to the extent Code may recover any fees for his service, it shall be calculated at 
Craig's cost-plus rate of $172.06. The Court finds that $172.06 per hour is a reasonable rate for 
in-house counsel in the local legal market for an attorney of Craig's experience. 
Craig's affidavit sets forth 104.75 hours working on this case. Craig attributes 63.5 hours 
of that time to working on Code's behalf. From September 2011 to May 2012, Craig's affidavit 
reflects nothing more than work reviewing the case to familiarize himself with it. As noted 
previously, the court does not believe it is reasonable for an opposing party to pay attorney fees 
incurred for a new attorney to learn about the case when the party voluntarily replaces an 
attorney. 
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In July 2012, Craig spent time doing some research and also helped prepare for trial. In 
early August 2012, Craig assisted in preparation for trial and attended the trial. During trial, 
Craig sat in the back of the courtroom and did not assist Fuller or Edgar, who presented the 
Defendants' case, in any manner. 
As noted above, Code is entitled to hire as many attorneys as she deems necessary. It 
appears, however, that with respect to Craig, she has done nothing more than hire a person to 
help Fuller, who was not Code's attorney. Further, although Craig's affidavit claims to separate 
out the time Craig spent on behalf of Code from the time he spent on behalf of other defendants. 
The court finds that there was no meaningful distinction. Indeed, Craig is in-house counsel for a 
company partially owned by Schvaneveldt, the losing party in this case. 
· Accordingly, the court finds that Code has not met her burden to show that the fees 
incurred by Code pursuant to Craig's representation were reasonable and necessary. To the 
extent that Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks compensation for fees incurred during 
Attorney Craig's representation, Code's Motion is denied. 
D. Attorney Scott Edgar 
At some point after Code discharged Sykes, Attorney Scott Edgar left Sykes' finn and 
began his own practice. About one week before trial, Code hired Edgar to help with trial 
preparation and other matters. At the time of Edgar's representation, Edgar's hourly fee was 
$180.00 per hour. This fee is a mere $5.00 hirer than Edgar's fee when he was Sykes' associate. 
The court finds that it is reasonable. 
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Edgar's affidavit reflects that from July 23, 2012, to July 27, 2012, Edgar spent 14.2 
hours familiarizing himself with the case and discussing strategy with Fuller. Code may not 
recover for Edgar's time familiarizing himself with the case, as previously explained. 
From July 27, 2012, to August 7, 2010, Edgar spent 99.8 hours preparing for and 
attending the trial, and helping prepare a motion for directed verdict which was granted. · The 
Court finds that this time was reasonable and necessary to the ultimate resolution of the case in 
Code's favor with one exception. On August 2, 2012, Edgar spent fifteen hours preparing for 
final pretrial and discussing trial strategy with Fuller. The court finds that this amount of time is 
unreasonable because Code's interest in the action are different than those of the other 
defendants and it should not have been necessary for Edgar to participate in trial preparation to 
the extent that he did. Accordingly, the 99.8 hours shall be reduced by seven hours. 
Edgar is Code's current counsel arguing this motion for attorney fees. Edgar's affidavit, 
submitted prior to the May 10, 2013 hearing, reflects that he has spent 35.5 hours researching 
and preparing the instant motion. The court finds that this time is reasonable and necessary. 
Having reviewed all of the billing in Edgar's affidavits, and accounting for the above 
deductions, the court orders that to the extent Code's Motion for Attorney Fees seeks 
compensation for Scott Edgar's representation, Code may recover attorney fees in the amount of 
$23,094.00. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Plaintiffs, i.e., Hilary 'Skip' Wing, dba ReMax Elite; Elite Legacy Corp., dba ReMax 
Elite; and Aspenwood Real Estate Corp., dba ReMax Elite (collectively "ReMax") have also 
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filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees against Schvaneveldt based on the attorney fees 
provision of the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement. 
ReMax first brought its claim against Schvaneveldt in its September I 0, 2009 Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Prior to that time, however, ReMax had done significant 
work progressing its case for a commission. That work included filing its September I 0, 2008 
Amended Complaint seeking the commission from Still Standing Stables and conducting 
extensive discovery, among other things. During the course of discovery, around April 2009, 
ReMax discovered evidence indicating that Schvaneveldt was personally liable for the 
commission. Accordingly, ReMax moved to amend its complaint and add Schvaneveldt as a 
defendant. Over the next few years LeBaron & Jensen represented ReMax in its efforts to obtain 
the commission. 
During the August 2012 jury trial, ReMax prevailed on its claim for the commission 
against Schvaneveldt. Further, prior to the trial, all of the defendants' claims against ReMax and 
Shea were dismissed. Accordingly, ReMax is the prevailing party with respect to Schvaneveldt 
and is entitled to a reasonable and necessary attorney fee for its efforts to collect from 
Schvaneveldt. ReMax is not the prevailing party with respect to Still Standing Stables or Code, 
and is not entitled to recover attorney fees for its efforts to collect from Code or Still Standing 
Stables. In the case ofReMax's claim, however, the court finds no reasonable distinction 
between the efforts expended to assert a claim against the various defendants; accordingly, the 
fee will not permit recovery of any work that was clearly directed at either SSS or Code 
individually. 
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During the course of litigation, there was some confusion about whether LeBaron & 
Jensen represented ReMax or just Tim Shea. This confusion was compounded by LeBaron & 
Jensen's consistent involvement with Shea, even though Shea was not a party to this litigation. 
LeBaron & Jensen's communication with Shea is understandable because Shea, pursuant to an 
Assignment of Claim agreement with ReMax, had authority concerning the direction and 
resolution of the case. Nonetheless, because Shea was not the party in interest, LeBaron & 
Jensen should not have filed motions on his behalf.7 
The court does not find any of the evidence presented by Schvaneveldt arguing that 
LeBaron & Jensen did not represent ReMax in its pursuit of the commission claim persuasive. 
Since ReMax filed its initial Motion to Amend in June 2008, all of the filings related to ReMax's 
efforts to obtain the commission were filed by LeBaron & Jensen. LeBaron & Jensen appeared 
as counsel for ReMax at multiple hearings and during the jury trial. Those snippets of evidence 
reflecting Skip Wing's mistaken understanding of the attorney client relationship are 
insignificant given the overwhelming amount of times that LeBaron & Jensen appeared on his 
behalf without his objection. Further, Attorney Duncan's statements in emails concerning the 
fact that he did not represent Skip Wing were a result of the confusing relationship, not an 
expression of the actual state of affairs. Lastly, the "Assignment of Claim" signed by Skip Wing 
clearly states: "ReMax will assign its claims to Tim Shea and authorize Tim's lawyer [LeBaron 
& Jensen] to act as co-counsel to ReMax's counsel on ReMax's behalf .... " This agreement 
1 To the extent that such motions were pertaining to Shea's defense of the counterclaims brought against him, it was 
entirely appropriate to include his name on the filings. However, it is the court's impression that such motions were 
filed by Attorney Wallace. 
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established an attorney-client relationship that was never terminated. Motion to Strike and 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination and Award of Attorney Fees at Exhibit 2. 
Schvaneveldt has argued that ReMa-x should not be permitted to obtain its attorney fees 
because LeBaron & Jensen had a conflict of interest representing both Shea & ReMax. The 
court agrees that there was a conflict of interest in representing both Shea and ReMax. 
Specifically, ReMax's interest in the commission was limited to $10,000, but Shea's interest was 
much greater. This created a natural conflict of interest. Any settlement offers around $10,000 
would have been reasonable for ReMax to accept, except out of consideration for Shea Pursuant 
to rule l.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, however, this conflict was waiveable. 
ReMax arguably waived this conflict when it assigned its claim to Shea. The ''Assignment of 
Claim" agreement states: 
:'•: . Tim Shea may in his own name and for his own benefit prosecute, collect, 
settle, compromise and grant releases on said claim as he, in his sole discretion, 
deems advisable. However, the parties agree that it will be best if Tim prosecutes, 
collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax's name, but do so for . 
Tim's benefit, except for the consideration amount mentioned above. 
Accordingly, the parties agree that Tim's lawyer may represent Tim's interests 
and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax' s offensive claim against 
Still Standing Stable, LLC, but that any and all strategy decisions and settlement 
decisions made as to the offensive claim for commission will be made by Tim 
Shea and his lawyer(s), and that the parties will cooperate with each other in 
making strategy and settlement decisions generally. 
Motion to Strike and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination and Award of Attorney 
Fees at Exhibit 2. 
Given the presence of this language in the Assignment of Claim, and the lack of evidence 
concerning other discussions between ReMax and LeBaron & Jensen. The court cannot 
conclusively state that LeBaron & Jensen has violated the rule against conflicts of interest. 
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Schvaneveldt also asserts that LeBaron & Jensen violated rule 1.5( c) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct by failing to obtain ReMax's approval in writing for their contingency fee 
arrangement. LeBaron & Jensen did not address this argument in their briefing and appeared to 
concede Schvaneveldt's point during oral argument. The Assignment of Claim, however, 
directly states the tenns ofLeBaron & Jensen's fee agreement with ReMax. It states: 
... after the consideration amount is paid to ReMax, ... Tim Shea and Tim's 
lawyer will thereafter receive the remainder of whatever is recovered, to be split 
in accordance 'With the agreement between Tim Shea and Tim's lawyer. 
This language is somewhat ambiguous. The court, however, finds that the mutual intent of 
Remax and LaBaron & Jensen was that ReMax was to pay for LeBaron & Jensen's services 
pursuant to a preexisting fee agreement between Shea and LeBaron & Jensen. Schvaneveldt has 
not presented any evidence that the contingency agreement between Shea and LeBaron & Jensen 
was not in writing. 8 Accordingly, this court cannot determine that LeBaron & Jensen has 
violated rule 1.5. 
Even if the court did find a violation of the rules of professional conduct, the court does 
not believe imposing a sanction denying a client's motion for attorney fees is an appropriate 
sanction for a client's attorneys' violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, especially 
when that client has not raised the issue or objected. 
Schvaneveldt also argues, without citing any supporting authority, that ReMax is not 
entitled to fees incurred prior to December 17, 20 I 0, when this court granted Still Standing 
Stables' Motion to Enforce a Mandatory Dispute Resolution Agreement. The court is not 
8 Shea's contingency fee agreement with LeBaron & Jensen is somewhat unique: Shea agreed to pay LeBaron & 
Jensen's nonnal hourly rate only ifhe prevailed on the commission claim. Though an unusual contingency 
agreement, it is a bargain the parties could make; it is, therefore, reasonable. 
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persuaded. ReMax is entitled to those fees which are reasonable and necessary. Despite the fact 
that ReMax' s initial claims were dismissed in favor of enforcing the dispute resolution 
agreement, the dismissal was without prejudice, and the effort expended on this case prior to that 
time was equally reasonable and necessary to pursuing its case. Additionally, that work 
perfonned prior to the Second Amended Answer, which added Schvaneveldt as a defendant, was 
also reasonable an necessary. Indeed, it was during discovery conducted prior to the time 
Schvaneveldt was added as a defendant that ReMax learned that Schvaneveldt was personally 
liable for the commission. 
Lastly, Schvaneveldt argues that ReMax is not entitled to attorney fees against him 
because "There is no mention of Chuck Schvaneveldt ... in the Assignment." Motion to Strike 
and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Detennination and Award of Attorney Fees at 13. 
Schvanefeldt points to a completely irrelevant document. ReMax asserts that it is entitled to 
attorney fees under the For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement. 
Accordingly, the court determines that ReMax is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
ReMax's fees are to be calculated in accordance with Shea's agreement with LeBaron & Jensen, 
i.e., because Plaintiffs prevailed, ReMax must pay LeBaron & Jensen their hourly rate. The 
court will analyze LeBaron & Jensen's affidavit of fees utilizing the same principles as outlined 
in its discussion regarding Code's motion for fees. 
Attorney LeBaron' s affidavit reflects that five attorneys from his firm worked on 
ReMax's case: Brian Duncan, Tyler Jensen, Mary Decker, Elicia Hansen, and himself. 
LeBaron's, Duncan's, and Jensen's hourly rate was $200.00 per hour. At the beginning of this 
case, each had practiced law for about eight years. The court finds that $200.00 per hour is a 
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reasonable fee for their services. Decker and Hansen each had one year experience at the time 
that they helped with the case. Their hourly rate was $150.00 per hour. The court finds that 
$150.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for their services. 
With respect to the charges listed in LeBaron's affidavit, the court makes the following 
findings: (1) LeBaron & Jensen did not represent Tim Shea as a party in this case. This should 
have been readily apparent to LeBaron & Jensen from the moment this court granted their first 
motion to amend in 2008, but specifically stated that Shea did not have a claim. (2) This case 
has been extremely complex. Nonetheless, some of this case's burden could have been avoided 
ifLeBaron & Jensen had heeded this court's directive that Tim Shea could not assert a claim and 
refrained from repeatedly asserting that motions were being filed both on his behalf and on 
behalf of ReMax. The court believes Re Max is responsible for its own fees that were generated 
due to this confusing act. (3) Likewise, LeBaron & Jensen spent a vast amount of time 
responding to motions brought by Fuller which lacked merit and did nothing more than repeat 
previously rejected arguments. The court believes Schvaneveldt is responsible for his attorneys' 
repeated attempts to assert matters the court had already rejected. 
Pursuant to the principles outlined above, both in the preceding paragraph and in the 
discussion of Code's motion for attorney fees, the court finds that all ofLeBaron & Jensen's 
claimed attorney fees are reasonable and necessary with the following exceptions: 
1. Page 3, line 4, "05/22/2008 ... Draft Answer and Counterclaim against Still Standing 
Stables" shall be reduced from one hour to thirty minutes because ReMax lost the 
Counterclaim against Still Standing Stables. 
v) 
,.;; 
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2. Page 3, line 5, "05/28/2008 ... Revise and draft Tim Shea Answer and Complaint" shall be 
excised because Tim Shea's "Complaint" was stricken. 
3. Page 5, line 11, "02/10/2009 ... research issue of attorney client privilege and review of 
Complaint." The court believes this research is likely related to LeBaron & Jensen's own 
professional obligations. It is unreasonable to expect Scvaneveldt to pay for it. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Page 5, line 13, "03/03/2009 ... Review e-mails and send e-mails out" shall be excised for 
lack of an explanation concerning the relationship to the case. 
Page 7, line 7, "06/26/2009 ... Read and respond to e-mails" shall be excised for lack of an 
explanation concerning the relationship to the case. 
Page 9, line 5, "09/10/2009 ... Researched case law regarding partial motion for summary 
judgment as to the ready, willing and able buyer issue. Began drafting Memorandum in 
support of the Motion" shall be reduced from 8 hours to 4 hours. The court feels that this 
entry, in conjunction with previous billable entries, reflects an excess of time researching a 
single issue. 
7. Page 11, line 14, "04/07/2010 ... Prepare Motion in Opposition for Motion for more time" 
shall be excised. The court feels that this is an iconic example of the attorneys' failure to 
communicate with each other, and give reasonable extensions of time when requested. The 
court will not reward inflexibility regarding deadlines to be rewarded with a grant of 
attorney fees. See Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility, Rules 10 and 14. 
8. Page 13, line 3, "07/27/2010 ... Attend failed deposition for ReMax." Without more 
information concerning why this deposition failed, the court is not willing to require 
Schvaneveldt to pay for it. 
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9. Page 13, line 8, "09/02/2010 ... Memorandum in Opposition to Code's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Attorney Fees. Filed on 09/07/2010." This work was caused by 
LeBaron & Jensen's own failure to cle~ly identify their attorney client relationship and 
continued filings naming Shea as the party in interest despite that his claims had been 
stricken. Accordingly, neither party shall be compensated for work associated with Code's 
first two motions for attorney fees. 
10. Page 13, line 10, "09/16/2010 ... Review and initial research of Replay on Code's 
Summary Judgment Motion." This work pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees. 
11. Page 13, line 10, "09/20/2010 ... Motion and Memorandum to Strike Reply Memorandum. 
Filed on 09/22/2010." This work pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees, and was 
without merit. 
12. Page 13, line 11, "10/06/2010 ... Reply Brief on Motion to Strike. Filed on 10/12/2010." 
This work pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees, and was without merit. 
13. Page 14, line 1, "10/07/2010 ... Phone call with clerk about Motion to Strike." This work 
pertained to Code's first motion for attorney fees, and was without merit. 
14. Page 16, line 1, "12/10/2010 ... Meeting with Miles and review of Cathy Code's Summary 
Judgment Motion. Filed 12/13/2010." This work pertains to Code's second motion for 
attorney fees, which was caused by ReMax's inclusion of Shea's stricken claims in the 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim. 
15. Page 16, line 2, "12/13/2010 ... Read and respond to Mediation e-mail; review of Summary 
Judgment Motion; work on Response to Motion for Summary Judgment." This shall be 
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reduced from 5.7 hours to .3 hours. The work related to the motion for summary judgment 
is related to Code's second motion for attorney fees. 
16. Page 16, line 3, "12/13/2010 ... Finish draft of Memorandum in Opposition to 2nd Code 
Attorney Swnmary Judgment; Discuss new SSS Motion fro Summary Judgment; make 
revisions to Code Motion and review Still Standing Stables' Motion." This shall be reduced 
from 4.4 hours to 2.2 hours because some of the work is related to Code's second motion for 
attorney fees. 
17. Page 16, line 9, "12/30/2010 ... Study docket and file and do research on issues of the 
dismissal; check docket and prepare various objections and responses to current pleadings 
such as submission and objections; put together game plan and list of pleadings to prepare." 
This shall be reduced from 4.9 hours to 4 hours. The court believes that some of this work 
wru{in anticipation of filing a rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order enforcing 
mandatory mediation. This order was sound, and any challenges thereto were without merit. 
The court will not require Schvaneveldt to pay for ReMax's refusal to accept this court's 
judgment. 
18. Page 16, line 10, "12/31/2010 ... Research on issues of fraud on court and 60(b)(3) issues." 
Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) 
motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
19. Page 16, line 11, "01/03/2011 ... Revise and file objections and reply to objection (fild on 
01/03.2011); prepare Reply Memo as to Code on Motion to Amend; prepare Memorandum 
in Opposition to time to Extend Answer to our Motion for Summary Judgment or to Strike; 
Work on 60(b) Motion. Files on 01/10/2011." This work shall be reduced from 5.9 to 3.9 
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hours. Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 
60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
20. Page 17, line 2, "01/10/2011 ... Finish 60(b) Motion and Prepare MOP to Motion to Strike 
3rd Motion to Amend .... " This work shall be reduced from 3 .4 hours to 2.4 hours. Like 
those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax' s rule 60(b) motion 
challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
21. Page 17, line 4, "01/13/2011 ... Review of Cathy Code's Reply Memo ... on Motion for 
Summary Judgment." This work is related to Code's second motion for attorney fees. 
22. Page 17, line 6, "02/01/2011 ... Read and Draft Opposition to Motion to Extend 60(b) 
Answer." Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's 
rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
23. Page 17, line 7, "02/02/2011 ... Prepare exhibits for Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Extend Answer to 60(b)." Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work 
deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory 
mediation .. 
24. Page 18, line 3, "03/22/2011 ... Review latest pleading; work on Reply to 60(b) Motion .. 
. " Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) 
motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
25. Page 18, line 4, "03/22/2011 ... Work on reply to 60(b) .... " Like those fees described in 
paragraph 17 above, this work deals with ReMax's rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's 
order to enforce mandatory mediation. 
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26. Page 18, line 9, "03/25/2011 ... Contunied work on Reply Memorandum for 60(b) Motion." 
Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals ·with ReMax' s rule 60(b) 
motion challenging the court's order t_o enforce mandatory mediation. 
27. Page 18, line 10, "03/28/2011 ... Prepare for Filing and hand deliver 60(b) Reply 
Memorandum to Court." Like those fees described in paragraph 17 above, this work deals 
with ReMax's rule 60(b) motion challenging the court's order to enforce mandatory 
mediation. 
28. Page 18, line 14, "06/06/2011 ... Review of various documents regarding bankruptcy of 
Tim Shea; review of Bankruptcy code and Utah law regarding interest in contingency fee 
case, draft objection to Motion to Settle.'' Work related to Tim Shea's Bankruptcy is 
unriecessary because Tim Shea was not LeBaron & Jensen's client in this case. While this 
work may be important with respect to Shea's status as a client outside of this litigation, 
LeBaron & Jensen have not shown how this work was necessary to pursuing ReMax' s claim 
for a commission. 
29. Page 18, line 15, "06/06/2011 ... Work with Tyler Jensen to get Objection to Settlement put 
together and filed." This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
30. Page 19, line 1, "06/20/2011 ... Meeting with Mike Bingham to go over additional research 
for objection to Motion to settle as filed by David Miller." This work deals with Shea's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
31. Page 19, line 2, "06/21/2011 ... Telephone call with David Miller." This work deals with 
Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
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32. Page 19, line 3, "06/22/2011 ... Conducted extensive research and talked with Miles about 
research findings .... " This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
33. Page 19, line 4, "06/23/2011 ... Prepare for, travel to and from, and appear at hearing in 
Bankruptcy Court .... " This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
34. Page 19, line 5, "06/24/2011 ... Discussionwith·Miles LeBaron regarding how to proceed 
with the Bankruptcy matter .... " This work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
35. Page 19, line 6, "06/24/2011 ... Strategy discussion with Tyler Jensen on when to approach 
David Miller again about abandoning the claim .... " This work deals with Shea's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
36. Page 19, line 8, "08/18/2011 ... Phone call to heath Isaacs to talk about how the hearing on 
the objection to Tim Shea's exemption status on the real-estate commissions .... " This 
work deals with Shea's bankruptcy proceedings. 
37. Page 20, line 2, "10/12/2011 ... Phone call from Tim Shea to discuss case status and 
strategy; Draft email to Heath Isaacs, Bankruptcy counsel .... " This work deals with Shea's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
38. Page 33, line 8, "11/27/2012 ... Review previous associate's work on attorney fees issue ... 
. " The court will not allow recovery of fees for duplicate work due to change of attorneys. 
39. Page 35, line 7, "01/04/2013 ... Review of Code Motion for Attorney fees." This deals 
with the claim that ReMax lost. 
40. Page 35, line 9, "01/04/2013 ... Draft Memorandum ... ; Began review of Cathy Code's 
Motion for Attorney Fees." This work shall be reduced from 6.5 hours to 4 hours because 
some of the work deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
· .J 
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41. Page 36, line 2, "01/15/2013 ... Discussion v.iith Elicia Hansen regarding opposing 
counsel's Motion for Attorney Fees .... " This deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
42. Page 36, line 3, "01/16/2013 ... Review Motion for Attorney fees (Code's); Discuss case 
with Miles; review case law; review Affidavits; Review Miles' Reply Memorandum on 
Motion to Quash." This work shall be reduced from 4.1 hours to 2 hours because some of 
the work deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
43. Page 36, line 4, "01/16/2013 ... Work on Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash 
Supplemental Order; Continued work with Brian Duncan on Memorandum in Opposition to 
Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees." This work shall be reduced from 2.4 hours to 1.2 
hours because some of the work deals with the claim that ReMax lost. 
44. Page 36, line 5, "01/21/2013 ... Continued research and drafting on issue of attorney fees 
categorizing and reasonableness." This work shall be reduced from 2.8 hours to 1.4 hours 
. because this description does not specify whether this work was done to support ReMax's 
motion for fees or to defend Code's motion for fees. 
45. Page 36, line 6, "01/22/2013 ... Work on finishing draft of issue ofreasonable and 
categorized attorneys fees." This work shall be reduced from I. 8 hours to .9 hours because 
this description does not specify whether this work was done to support ReMax' s motion for 
fees or to defend Code's motion for fees. 
46. Page 36, line 7, "01/22/2013 ... Work on research and drafting Memorandum in Opposition 
to Charles Schvaneveldt's Motion for New Trial; Meet wit [sic] Syracuse City Attorney on 
issues of alleged criminal conduct." This work shall be reduced from 4.7 hours to 2.5 hours 
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because this description does not indicate how the meeting regarding criminal conduct 
related to prosecution of ReMax' s claim for a commission against Schvaneveldt. 
47. Page 37, line 7, "02/01/2013 ... Work on Memorandum in Opposition to Cathy Code's 
Motion for Attorney's Fees .... " This work deals with a claim that ReMax lost. 
48. Page 37, line 8, "02/06/2013 ... Discussion with Miles about Attorneys fees Motion (Cathy 
Code's)." This work deals with a claim that ReMax lost. 
Having reviewed all of the billing in LeBaron's affidavit, which amounted $160,978.50, 
and accounting for the above deductions, which amount to $13,607.50, the court orders that 
ReMax may recover attorney fees in the amount of $147,371.00. 
Further the court finds that all of LeBaron & Jensen's claimed costs are reasonable and 
necessary with the following exceptions: (1) Page 13, line 7, "09/01/201 Copies"; and (2) "Page 
27, line 7, "08/02/2012 ... Airfare for Hilary 'Skip' Wing to fly here for the Trial." Copies are 
not "fees that are required to be paid to the court and witnesses" and are not recoverable. 
Further, the costs of a client attending the trial is not a taxable cost. ReMax requested $2,887.26 
in costs, these deductions total $579.00. Accordingly, ReMax may recover $2,308.26 in costs. 
Still Standing Stables' and Code's Memorandum of Costs 
On January 9, 2013, SSS and Code, both prevailing parties in this case, filed a 
Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Plaintiffs failed to file the required 
"motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court," advising the court of their objection to any 
costs included in SSS's and Code's Memorandum. The court is tempted to award the requested 
costs based solely on Plaintiffs' failure to object. However, given this court's responsibility to 
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do justice and only award those costs permitted under rule 54( d), the court determines that it will 
evaluate the Memorandum of Costs on the merits. 
Rule 54( d)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Accordingly, the costs 
claimed must be incurred by a prevailing party to the action. Here, Plaintiffs brought claims 
against three defendants: Still Standing Stables, L.C.; Cathy Code; and Chuck Schvaneveldt. 
The claims against Still Standing Stables and Code were dismissed, but Plaintiffs prevailed on 
their claims against Schvaneveldt. Based on the fact that two of the three defendants prevailed, 
and their costs were shared during the course of litigation, SSS and Code assert that they are 
entitled to two-thirds of the costs incurred. SSS and Code, however, do not point to any law 
which allows for such a blunt division of the costs incurred, or explain how the division of costs 
were billed to the individual defendants. This blunt division is especially tr,oubling because SSS 
was named as a defendant in ReMax's September 10, 2008 Amended Complaint, but 
Schvaneveldt and Code were not added as defendants until the September 10, 2009 Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Clearly the costs were not equally divided between the 
defendants. 
The only meaningful distinction that the court can conclude is to permit SSS to recover 
its taxable costs which were incurred during that period when SSS was the only named 
defendant. Once Schvaneveldt and Code were added as defendants and began sharing their costs 
with SSS, it becomes impossible to distinguish the costs incurred on behalf of Schvaneveldt, a 
losing party, from the costs incurred by SSS or Code in any meaningful way, at least based on 
the cursory information provided by SSS and Code. 
RULING AND ORDER ON CHUCK SCHV ANEVELDT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRJAL AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE . 
Case No. 060906802 
Page38 of40 
According to the Memorandum of Costs, SSS incurred the following costs before 
Schvaneveldt and Code were added as defendants: (1) the costs associated with the depositions 
of Chuck Schvaneveldt, Tim Shea, John Doxey, Nina Cleere, and Cathy Code, totaling 
$2,659.73; and (2) $35.00 to subpoena Metro National Title. 
The court may only award-the prevailing party its costs of depositions if 
it finds that the depositions are taken in good faith, and are essential to the party's 
development and presentation of its case, either because the depositions were used 
in a meaningful way at trial, or because the development of the case was of such a 
complex nature that the information provided in the deposition could not have 
been obtained through less expensive means of discovery. 
Young v. State, 2000 UT 91 at ,r 23. Here, as illustrated above, this case has a long and complex 
history, and the court believes SSS conducted the five depositions in good faith. Accordingly, in 
light of Plaintiffs' failure to specifically object to any of the depositions in writing, as required 
by rule 54(d)(2), the court assumes that SSS's depositions were reasonable and necessary to 
obtain the information provided, and SSS is entitled to recover those costs. 
Regarding the $35.00 subpoena fee related to Metro National Title, "costs" as defined in 
rule 54(d) are "fees that are required to be paid to the court and witnesses." Id. see also Beaver 
v. Quest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001) (excluding a contour model, photographs, and certified 
copies as not taxable costs of court). While the cost of serving a subpoena may be necessary to 
advance discovery, it is not "fees that are required to be paid to the court and witnesses." 
Accordingly, SSS cannot recover the $35.00 costs associated with its subpoena served on Metro 
National Title. 
Accordingly, SSS is entitled to recover $2,659.73 for those costs associated with the 
depositions taken prior to the time Schvaneveldt and Code were added as defendants. SSS and 
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Code have failed to provide any meaningful way to distinguish their costs from Schvaneveldt's 
costs after Schvaneveldt was added as a defendant. Therefore, SSS and Code are not entitled to 
any of their costs incurred after Schvaneveldt was added as a defendant. 
Accordingly, the court orders as follows: 
1. Code's Motion for Attorney Fees is granted in part and denied in part. Code may recover 
$21,135.50 for the representation of Robert B. Sykes & Associates and $23,094.00 for 
the representation of Scott Edgar. In all other respects Code's Motion for Attorney Fees 
is denied. 
2 .. ReMax's Motion for Detennination and Award of Attorney Fees is granted in part and 
·denied in part. ReMax may recover $147,371.00 in attorney fees and $2,308.26 in costs. 
3. ·Still Standing Stables and Code's Memorandum of Costs is granted in part and denied in 
part. Still Standing Stables is entitled to recover $2,659.73 for those costs associated 
with the depositions taken prior to the time Schvaneveldt and Code were added as 
defendants. In all other respects the motion for costs is denied. 
This is the Court's final order on attorney fees and costs; no further order pursuant to Rule 
7(f) is required. 
DATED this _.j2.. day of 2013 
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EXHIBIT 2 
July 22 , 2013 Ruling 
(holding Skip Wing personally liable for attorney fee award) 
FILED [!~L~>ml l 
SECOND 
!STRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT JUL 2 2 2013 
. IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HILARY "SKIP WING, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
RULING & ORDER ON MOTIONS TO 
CLARIFY AND SCHV ANEVELDT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS COMMISSION 
CLAIMS BASED ON LACK OF 
STANDING AND JURISDICTION vs. 
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al., Case No. 060906802 
Defendants. Judge Michael D. Lyon 
This matter is before the court on three motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify, (2) Still 
Standing Stable's Motion to Clarify and Identify Real Parties, and (3) Chuck Schvaneveldt's 
Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify 
On June 6, 2013, this court entered a ruling on Cathy Code's Motion for Attorney Fees, 
holding that Tim Shea was not liable for Ms. Code's attorney fees because he had not filed an 
action against Ms. Code. The ruling also held that with respect to the other plaintiffs' claims, 
Ms. Code is the prevailing party and is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney fees. 
The court's ruling continued a longstanding practice, advanced by Plaintiffs, of asserting that the 
"plaintiffs" functioned as a singular unit. Plaintiffs now seek to draw a distinction between 
Hilary "Skip" Wing, and the other Plaintiffs, arguing that Mr. Wing, unlike the other Plaintiffs, 
never asserted that he was a party to the For Sale By Owner Agreement ("FSBO,') on which 
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Code's Motion for Attorney Fees was based, and, therefore, he cannot be held personally liable 
for Ms. Code's attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs' January 31, 2012 Third Party Complaint against Cathy Code was filed by 
"Elite Legacy Corporation D/B/ A Re/Max Elite, Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation D/B/ A 
Re/Max Elite, and Hilary Owen "Skip" Wing, principal broker D/B/ A as Re/Max Elite 
(hereinafter "ReMax Elite" collectively) .... " Third Am. Answer and Countercl. of Timothy 
Shea and ReMax Elite to the Third Party Comp!. of Still Standing Stables, L.C. and Chuck 
Schvaneveldt; and Third Party Compl. Against Cathy Code at 8 (Jan. 31, 2012). The Complaint 
never attempts to draw any distinctions between the various plaintiffs. Indeed, the Complaint 
collectively refers to the plaintiffs as "ReMax." Accordingly, when the collective "ReMax" 
asserted its claims against Cathy Code, Mr. Wing was included as a plaintiff, and Mr. Wing, like 
all of the plaintiffs, based his claim for a commission on the For Sale By Owner commission 
agreement containing the attorney fees provision. Mr. Wing's claim that he never claimed to be 
a party to the FSBO is unfounded. 
A party is entitled to reciprocal fee-shifting by statute when the provisions of a 
contract would have entitled at least one party to recover its fees had that party 
prevailed in a civil action based upon the contract. 
Hooban v. Unicity Jnt'l, Inc., 285 P.3d 766, 772 (Utah 2012). Accordingly, because Mr. Wing, 
as part of the collective ReMax, asserted a cause of action against Ms. Code based upon the 
FSBO, and because Ms. Code prevailed on that cause of action, Mr. Wing, like the other 
plaintiffs, is liable for Ms. Code's attorney fees. 
The court finds Mr. Wing's policy arguments unpersuasive. First, it is unclear whether 
Mr. Wing had any obligation to join himself as a party in this suit. ReMax's corporate entities 
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had already asserted their claims for the commission, and, in response to Defendants' arguments 
that the corporate entities lacked standing, Mr. Wing added himself as a plaintiff. Plaintiffs 
argue that they only added Mr. Wing as a plaintiff out of an abundance of caution and to avoid 
continued haranguing over what they viewed as a non-issue being raised by defendants. The 
reasons that Plaintiffs chose to add Mr. Wing as a party in this action, however, are immaterial. 
Mr. Wing must accept the natural consequences of naming himself a plaintiff. It was his 
decision to join himself as a plaintiff, unaided by anything Defendants did and uninfluenced by 
any order of this court indicating that it was necessary. The court has never ruled that Mr. Wing 
was a necessary party, and it need not do so now. The fact is, Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. 
", Second, assuming Mr. Wing was a required party, there is no incentive for Mr. Wing not 
to fileJthis claim. Because Tim Shea was ultimately entitled to recover his commission, Mr. 
Wing had two choices: (1) he could file this claim and recover the commission on Mr. Shea's 
behalf, or (2) he could wait for Shea to sue him for the entire commission. The court fails to see 
how imposing attorney fees will alter this decision-making process. 
Lastly, Mr. Wing cannot receive all of the benefits of the FSBO without accepting all of 
the risks associated with that agreement. Here, Mr. Wing successfully pursued an action against 
the defendant Chuck Schvanveldt, and based on the very attorney fees provision he now seeks to 
avoid liability for, recovered attorney fees against Chuck Schvaneveldt. Allowing Mr. Wing to 
both recover attorney fees from Mr. Schvaneveldt and avoid liability for Ms. Code's attorney 
fees would be incongruous. 
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Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Clarify 
On June 25, 2013, Still Standing Stables ("SSS")filed its Motion to Clarify Rulings and 
Identify Real Parties, and on June 28, 2013, Schvaneveldt filed yet another motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing and jurisdiction. As both motions were prepared by attorney Robert Fuller and 
contain similar arguments, the court will address them both here. 
At the outset, the court expresses its dismay that Schvaneveldt and SSS continue to raise 
issues concerning standing after this case has already been through a jury trial and attorney fees 
have been awarded. Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point during 
litigation. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, 12. This court, however, loses jurisdiction once 
a final judgment is entered. This court entered ajudgment of$212,806.70 against Schvanveldt 
on January 2, 2013 ~ This case is over. A jury heard the issues, and the court awarded attorney 
fees to the prevailing parties. Issues regarding standing should have been raised years ago. 
The Court acknowledges that Defendants' current motions regarding standing are 
partially prompted by Plaintiffs' unmeritorious argument that Mr. Wing is not a party subje~t to 
liability for the award of attorney fees, but a simple memorandum in opposition to Mr. Wing's 
Motion to Clarify should have sufficed. This is precisely the type of cumulative and unnessary 
motion that justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to 
languish on the court's docket for years. 
~espite the court's hesitancy to even address Defendants' standing arguments, the court, 
out of an abundance of caution, will briefly address each of Defendants' arguments. 
First, on the basis of "recent discoveries regarding the true ownership of Remax Elite" 
Schvaneveldt argues that none of the plaintiffs were parties to the FSBO or Real Estate Purchase 
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Contract ("REPC"), but rather that the dba "ReMax Elite" was registered to Dale Quinlan 
("Quinlan") at the time the FSBO and REPC were signed, and that Quinlan never transferred the 
rights under the agreement to any of the plaintiffs. Raising this question of fact concerning the 
standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b ), 
governing motions for relief from judgment, is instructive here. It states that relief from 
judgment based on new evidence is only pennissible if (1) the motion is filed within three 
months after the judgment, and (2) due diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in 
time for a new trial under Rule 59(b ). Judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 
2013. Further, that judgment was entered based on a jury verdict entered in August 2012. Until 
this time, all of the parties had agreed that Mr. Wing was the principal broker ofReMax Elite, 
the contracting party. In fact, Defendants abandoned their previous arguments regarding 
standing once Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a 
jury trial and six months after entry of judgment will not be permitted. Even if this motion were 
timely, Schvaneveldt has provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have 
been discovered in time for a rule 59(b) motion. This case was filed in 2006, and the issues 
regarding the commission were first raised in 2008. It is beyond belief that Schvaneveldt could 
not have discovered this evidence with due diligence. 
Even if the court were inclined to consider Schvanveldt's new factual assertions, 
Schvanveldt's evidence attached to his Motion to Dismiss does not contradict the presumption 
that has always been present in this case, i.e., that Mr. Wing was the principal broker associated 
with the FSBO. Schvaneveldt' s evidence only shows that the dba Remax Elite was transferred to 
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Skip Wing a short time after the FSBO and REPC were consummated. It does not show that 
Quinlan did not assign the claims at some other time. 
Schvaneveldt's tries to establish that Quinlan did not transfer his claims to Mr. Wing by 
submitting his July 8, 2013 "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits in Support of: Motion to 
Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction" containing an 
affidavit of Dale Quinlan. Dale Quinlan states, "I do not believe nor do I have any recollection 
of ever assigning any commission agreement or contract rights between myself, doing business 
under the assumed name REMA ELITE, and the Seller, specified above, to any other individual 
nor entity." Based on this statement, and his own observations of the signatures, Schvaneveldt 
argues that a transfer never occurred and the letters of transfer "appear to be phoney documents 
filed with the State of Utah Division of Corporations with fraudulent intent." 
Even if Rule 60(b) did not bar consideration of Quinlan? s affidavit, which it does, the 
court never granted leave for Schvaneveldt to file "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits" and 
will not consider it, U.R.C.P. 7(c)(l) ("No other memoranda will be considered without leave of 
court"), except to note that allegations of forgery and fraud are affirmative defenses which must 
be raised in Defendants' Answer. U.R.C.P. 8. Although Defendants' Answer raised issues of 
forgery and fraud with respect to the FSBO and REPC, Defendants never raised any such issues 
pertaining to any Letter of Transfer; accordingly, such arguments are waived. 
Second, SSS argues that because Mr. Wing argues in his Motion to Clarify that he was 
not a party to the FSBO, Mr. Wing lacked standing to sue for the commission. Having rejected 
Mr. Wing's arguments, however, this issue is moot. The facts and procedural posture of this 
case are clear. Mr. Wing, as part of the collective "ReMax," sued the defendants for the 
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commission based on the FSBO, and Mr. Wing is the principal agent ofReMax, that was named 
as a party to the FSBO. Accordingly, Mr. Wing has standing to assert the commission claim. 
Defendants nearly admitted as much by abandoning their standing arguments once Mr. Wing 
was added as a plaintiff. 
Third, SSS argues that Elite Legacy Corporation does not have standing to sue because it 
was not a party to the FSBO and did not exist when the FSBO and REPC were signed. Elite 
Legacy Corporation and Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation are separate corporate entities that 
owned the dba ReMax Elite at different times. Both corporations have been plaintiffs in this 
action ever since the Third Amended Complaint was filed, and both entities were formed by the 
same principal agent, Mr. Wing. The court sees no value in drawing a distinction between them 
at this::time, when both entities are ultimately controlled by Mr. Wing, who is jointly liable. 
Fourth, SSS argues that Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation does not have standing to 
sue because it assigned its commission cause of action to Tim Shea. Although "ReMax" 
executed an Assignment containing language purporting to transfer "any and all claims, 
demands, and causes of action of any kind whatsoever which ReMax has or may have against 
Still Standing Stables, LLC," to Tim Shea, it is clear that the parties intended for ReMax to retain 
the right to pursue the commission claim. Specifically, the Assignment states, "Tim's lawyer 
may represent Tim's interests and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax 's offensive 
claim •... " (emphasis added). Further, the Assignment contemplates that Tim Shea did not have 
the right to bring the commission cause of action, stating " ... the parties agree that it will be best 
if Tim prosecutes, collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax's name .... " 
Accordingly, the court interprets the Assignment as giving Tim Shea the right to collect the 
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benefits of the commission claim, minus the first $10,000, and the right to direct the prosecution 
of the claim, but ReMax retained the right to stand as the formal party asserting the cause of 
action. This interpretation is strengthened by the timing of the Assignment, September 2008, the 
same month that this court granted ReMax and Shea's first motion to amend but clarified that 
only the principal broker could assert the commission claim. Ruling Granting Motion for Leave 
to Amend, (September 2, 2008). 
Lastly, Defendants insist that Aspenwood and Elite Legacy do not have standing because 
they are defunct corporations, and are not "principal brokers." This is an exact replica of 
standing arguments asserted years ago, which Defendants abandoned because Mr. Wing was 
added as a plaintiff. Defendants were wise to abandon this argwnent after Mr. Wing was added 
as a party, and they should not have resurrected it here. Because Mr. Wing is the principal of 
both corporations, and a party to this action, drawing a distinction between them is meaningless. 
Toe parties' requests for a hearing on these matters are denied; oral argument will not 
assist the court in deciding the issues herein addressed. 
Order & Judgment 
Accordingly, Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims 
Based on Lack of Standing and Jwisdiction is denied. To the extent that Defendant Still 
Standing Stable's Motion to Clarify seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' commission claim, it is denied. 
To the extent that the parties' seek clarification regarding who is a judgment creditor and who is 
a judgment debtor, the court finds and rules as follows: 
-~ 
RULING & ORDER ON MOTIONS TO CLARIFY AND SCHVANEVELDT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMMISSION CLAIMS BASED ON LACK OF STANDING AND JURISDICTION 
Case No. 060906802 
Page 9 of 10 
closed. 
(1) On January 2, 2013, pursuant to a jury verdict, the court entered judgment for 
$212,806.70 against Schvaneveldt and in favor of all three plaintiffs named in this 
action. 
(2) Pursuant to the court's June 6, 2013 order granting an award of attorney fees, the 
court now amends the January 2, 2013 judgment to include the attorney fees and costs 
of $149,679.26 against Chuck Schvaneveldt and in favor of all three named plaintiffs 
in this action. The new judgment against Chuck Schvaneveldt shall total 
$362,485.96. 
(3) Pursuant to the court's June 6, 2013 order granting an award of attorney fees, the 
court orders that judgment for $44,229.50 be entered against all three named plaintiffs 
in this case, including Hilary "Skip" Wing, and in favor of Cathy Code. 
(4) Pursuant to the court's June 6, ~013 order granting an award of attorney fees, the 
court orders that judgment for $2,659.73 be entered against all three named plaintiffs 
in this case, iI?-cluding Hilary "Skip,, Wing, and in favor of Still Standing Stables. 
( 5) Post-judgment interest shall accrued at the rate of 2.16%. 
No further order pursuant to rule 7(f) is required. The court is satisfied that this case is 
DAIBDthisJ:ioayof~2013 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
Hilary "Skip" Wing, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Still Standing Stable, LC., et al. 
Defendants. 
Ruling and Order on June 18, 
2014 Hearing on Defendants' 
Rule 52(b) Motion and 
Stipulated Motion to Release 
Bond 
Civil No. 060906802 
Honorable Noel S. Hyde 
On June 18, 2014, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde held a hearing on 
Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion and the Stipulated Motion to Release Bond. 
L. Miles LeBaron of LeBaron & Jensen, P.C. appeared for the Plaintiffs; 
Robert J. Fuller appeared for Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt and Still 
Standing Stables, L.C.; Scott R. Edgar appeared for Third-Party Defendant 
Cathy Code; and Alan S. Mouritsen of Parsons Behle & Latimer appeared for 
Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt. 
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Ruling on Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion 
The Court considered the Defendants' Rule 52 (b) Motion. Having 
reviewed the Motion and having heard the statements of the parties, the 
Court made the following Ruling from the Bench: 
The motion has been brought pursuant to Rule 52(b), which does 
permit amendment of findings, or the making of additional findings, subject 
to a motion brought within ten days after entry of a final judgment. 
The first issue to address in this case is the timeliness of the motion, 
and the Court rules that the motion is timely. 
The final judgment, within the meaning of the rule, was entered in this 
case on July 22nd • And this motion was brought on August 5th , which is 
within the ten-day timeframe as defined by the rule, and the motion 
therefore is timely and will be considered by the Court. 
Motions under Rule 52 permit modification or amendment of findings 
or additional findings to be judgments that are consistent with those 
modifications. The request in the present case seeks a modification or 
amended findings that relate to the ownership interest in a dba, and the 
involvement of Mr. Skip Wing in connection with the transactions which were 
the subject of the underlying proceeding. 
They also seek modifications with respect to findings or additional 
2 
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findings with respect to an assignment that has been identified as the Tim 
Shea assignment. 
Having considered all of the arguments and the written materials 
which have been presented, the Court notes that Rule 52 (b) permits that a 
motion under 52(b) for amendment may be combined with a motion for new 
trial under Rule 59. Motions under Rule 59 may also, in appropriate 
circumstances, address requests for modification of findings or judgments. 
And specifically, in reference to Rule 59, the provision that permits 
modification is found in Rule 59, subparagraph (e), which referenced 
specifically a motion to alter or amend a judgment. 
1And then the language with respect to additional or amended findings 
is found in the second part of subparagraph (a) of Rule 59. 
And in that particular section, with respect to Rule 59, the provision is 
that a court may open the judgment, if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, or make 
new findings of fact and direct the entry of a new judgment, and then there 
are particular criteria. 
However, that particular provision only applies, and that permission is 
only granted, or discretion is only available to the Court when the motion is 
for a new trial in an action tried without a jury. 
3 
This case was tried with a jury, and so the alternative under Rule 
59(a)( 4) that the Court is permitted to consider newly discovered evidence, 
provides that the party bringing the motion can only produce evidence that 
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
That is an issue which has been previously addressed, and this Court's 
ruling is not going to depart from the prior rulings. 
And that is, that the information specifically the documentation from 
the Department of Corporations, and the information contained in that 
documentation, also challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of 
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted, 
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable 
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was 
conducted in this case. 
The record is abundantly clear that these are all public records. They 
have been available to all of the parties throughout these proceedings. 
There have been references to the dba registration during the trial. 
There is documentation in the record of the Department of Corporations 
showing registrations in the corporate names of Elite Legacy and Aspenwood 
Real Estate. Those are all part of the record in the public file, and they were 
4 
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all available, as well as records including the signature of Dale Quinlan, 
which would put anyone on notice of his potential interest in those dbas. 
And the Court specifically rules that it is under Rule 59 that new 
evidence may be considered under appropriate circumstances. 
In this case, the Court's ruling is that the Rule 59 latitude for 
modification of findings and conclusions does not apply and is not available. 
And even if it were available, would not be justified based upon this 
evidence, which the Court rules is new evidence, which could reasonably 
have been known prior to the trial being conducted. 
···-With respect to Rule 52, which is the specific focus of the motion, and 
the tii-otion which the Court has determined to be timely, the Court's ruling is 
that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence. 
The policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and 
conclusions that are entered in the record are consistent with the record of 
the trial. And the opportunity to amend or correct, it is the Court's ruling, is 
an opportunity to ensure consistency with the trial record, not deviate from 
the trial record based upon consideration of additional evidence which was 
not considered or presented at trial. 
Further, with respect to these particular issues, the Court notes that 
when a judgment and verdict are entered, particularly when there is a jury 
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verdict entered, that any construction of the facts which may be considered 
by the Court requires the Court to construe the facts that are found, 
consistent with that judgment, and that if there are alternative constructions 
of the facts that are possible, from the facts as they are presented, the 
Court is required to construe those facts consistent with the judgment which 
was entered. 
And in this particular case, the Court's ruling with respect to the 
present motion is that, as has been demonstrated, there is evidence in the 
record of this trial, which is consistent with the determinations that were 
made. 
There is evidence in the trial in this case, of the registration of the dba 
in the names Elite Legacy and Aspenwood Real Estate. And while there 
certainly is documentation with respect to Mr. Quinlan's interest in the dba, 
the record of the trial, by acknowledgment of movant's counsel is devoid of 
any reference at all to Mr. Quinlan. And perhaps on that basis alone, it 
would be inappropriate for this Court to suggest any modification of the 
finding, to burden those findings with additional information relating to Mr. 
Quinlan, when none of that information was presented at trial. 
Those issues would be issues that may justify a new trial under Rule 
59; however that motion is not before the Court today. 
6 
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They may also possibly be considered under Rule 60 as alternate 
grounds for relief from judgment, but they do not form a basis for requested 
modification under Rule 52(b). 
Further, the Court will make its ruling with respect to some of the 
questions relating to the dba. 
The Court's ruling is that a dba is an asset. It is a unique and 
intangible asset, but nonetheless it is an asset. 
The arguments of the parties have repeatedly made reference to the 
dba being owned. That is a reference to its status as an asset, an intangible 
personal property asset, and the Court rules that a dba is such an asset, and 
it can'~e owned. 
And a dba, like other assets, may be owned or held or transferred by 
different parties, under different circumstances, and in different capacities. 
The fact that an individual's name is associated with a particular asset 
does not necessarily mean that it is presumptively established that all rights 
or attributes of that asset are exclusively held by the individuals in whose 
name the asset is held. 
It is possible, for example, for assets to be held in a representative 
capacity, or as agents for others. 
It is also possible for assets to be held in a somewhat segregated 
7 
capacity, where a legal title is held in one particular name, but equitable 
interests are actually owned by someone else. 
There has been nothing suggested in the arguments before the Court 
that some other alternative explanation of the ownership, or the listings of 
this asset in the name of Mr. Quinlan, could justify exactly the same record 
that exists, and support the findings exactly as they were found. 
There is evidence, and the evidence has even been discussed, that Mr. 
Quinlan was a principal broker for one of the business entities that was 
involved. He may very well have been acting as an agent for that business 
entity, or his name on that document may be in a representative capacity for 
that entity. 
And the Court is required again to construe the construction of facts to 
be supportive of the judgment, if such a construction is possible. And the 
Court rules, in this case, that it is. 
With respect to Mr. Quinlan, therefore, the Court finds the argument 
that simply his appearing on the initial application is conclusive of his 
ownership interest of all rights associated with that asset, from the time of 
the original application through the time of the purported assignment to, Still 
Standing Stable, is simply not a persuasive argument. 
And the circumstances of this case, in fact, suggest to the contrary 
8 
October 04, 2014 08:30 AM 8 of 16 
;,::, 
-
that he may have been simply functioning in his capacity as a participant in 
the business entity that owned the dba of Re/Max Elite, when his name was 
placed on that document. 
The Court further notes that many of the entities, Re/Max Elite being 
one, Elite Legacy being one, Aspenwood Real Estate being one, are all legal 
fictions. They are not tangible entities. They are not living and breathing. 
They exist as a bundle of legal rights. 
And they may represent individuals, they may represent associations 
of individuals, they could be represented or effectively owned or controlled 
by joint ventures or by partnerships. A general partnership can be 
established by an oral agreement, as can a joint venture. 
And all of those are possibilities that could explain the particular name 
as it appears on the original application, and be entirely consistent with the 
determinations which had previously been made, and the findings of the 
Court; and therefore, the Court rules that there has· not been a sufficient 
showing to justify a modification of the findings as they relate to the 
ownership of the dba. 
Further, there has been a request for modification of the findings as it 
relates to Mr. Skip Wing, based upon his articulation in various statements 
that he did not individually own or control the rights that were being 
9 
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asserted in the litigation. 
That particular position is not disputed, either in the testimony of Mr. 
Wing or in the arguments of plaintiff's counsel, and the Court believes that it 
is appropriate to make a clarification and modification to the existing rulings 
with respect to that issue. 
And that clarification will be that, to the extent that Skip Wing is 
identified as a party in these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims, 
that identification is Mr. Skip Wing, in his representative capacity, as 
principal broker for the brokerage, or as an agent or representative of the 
brokerage, and does not represent his individual and personal ownership of 
those claims. 
So the Court is not going to modify the findings to the extent of 
excluding his name, but will include the modification that to the extent that 
his name is included, that is a representation of his role in connection with 
the business entity, and that that role was the role of principal broker, 
representative, agent, or authorized representative of the brokerage. 
And that clarification will be made, to avoid any conclusion that the 
claims that are identified are individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing, 
independent of his role in connection with the business entity, and that 
modification will be approved. 
10 
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With respect to the reference to the assignment involving Mr. Shea, 
the Court's ruling on that issue is that plaintiff has simply not presented a 
sufficiently compelling case to justify any modification of the judgment or 
findings with respect to that issue. 
Whether or not statements as to the scope or extent of a particular 
assignment may have been reconsidered by parties after the fact, whether 
that is consistent or inconsistent with the testimony given at trial or 
considered earlier by the Court, has simply not been sufficiently established 
for this Court to make any modification of the prior rulings, and the Court 
simply ·declines to do so. 
The Court declines to make any modification of the findings or ruling 
as they relate to the purported assignment relating to Mr. Shea. 
There was a specific reference in the request that the language 
referring to a transfer of the dba to Mr. Wing be deleted as inaccurate. 
The Court's ruling, I believe has already addressed that. 
Any reference to Mr. Wing, whether in his capacity as holding the dba 
or as holding claims or causes of action, will be modified to refer to his 
holding those in a representative capacity for the benefit of the business 
entity or brokerage. 
Ruling on Stipulated Motion to Release the Bond 
11 
...... -~ ,4/:! 
The Court denies the motion, which is a purported stipulated motion to 
release the bond or approve the settlement. 
And the basis of the Court's ruling is that the purported stipulation 
does not properly identify the parties holding the judgment. 
There have been significant steps taken by the defendant in this case 
to construct an alternative set of facts which would give Mr. Quinlan certain 
rights under this judgment and purport to assign those rights to him. None 
of those have been established properly by the Court, and the findings which 
were previously made by the Court as to the holders of the claim remain 
undisturbed. And therefore, Mr. Quinlan does not have authority to act on 
behalf of the holders of the claim, based upon the Court's denying the 
request to modify the prior rulings, and therefore is not a proper party with 
authority to stipulate on issues relating to the bond or any other disposition 
of the claim. And so that motion is ·denied. 
ORDER 
Based upon the Court's Rulings, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. The Rule 52(b) Motion is denied with respect to Defendants' 
attempt to introduce the Dale Quinlan dba evidence post-trial, as 
there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence. The 
policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and 
12 
October 04, 2014 08:30 AM 12 of 16 
2. 
3. 
conclusions that are entered in the record are consistent with the 
record of the trial. The opportunity to amend or correct is an 
opportunity to ensure consistency with the trial record, not 
deviate from the trial record based upon consideration of 
additional evidence which was not considered or presented at 
trial. 
Rule 59 is the Rule of Civil Procedure providing that new 
evidence may be considered under appropriate circumstances. 
In this case, the Rule 59 latitude for modification of findings and 
conclusions does not apply and is not available. And even if it 
were available, would not be justified based upon the Dale 
Quinlan dba evidence, which the Court rules is new evidence, 
which could reasonably have been known prior to the trial being 
conducted. 
The Court grants the request for modification of the findings as it 
relates to Mr. Skip Wing, based upon his articulation in various 
statements that he did not individually own or control the rights 
that were being asserted in the litigation. That clarification will 
be that, to the extent that Skip Wing is identified as a party in 
these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims, that 
13 
Al)-.&Af""O 
4. 
5. 
identification is Mr. Skip Wing, in his representative capacity, as 
principal broker for the brokerage, or as an agent or 
representative of the brokerage, and does not represent his 
individual and personal ownership of those claims. The Court is 
not going to modify the findings to the extent of excluding Mr. 
Wing's name, but will include the modification that to the extent 
that his name is included, that is a representation of his role in 
connection with the business entity, and that that role was the 
role of principal broker, representative, agent, or authorized 
representative of the brokerage. That clarification will be made, 
to avoid any conclusion that the claims that are identified are 
individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing, independent of 
his role in connection with the business entity. 
The Court declines to make any modification of the findings or 
ruling as they relate to the purported assignment relating to Mr. 
Shea. 
The purported stipulated motion to release the bond or approve 
the settlement is denied. 
-------------------------END OF ORDER-------------------------
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Efiling Standard No. 4, and URCP 
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Rule lO(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but 
instead displays an electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first 
page of this Order. 
Approved as to form and content: 
/s/ Gary E. Doctorman 
Gary E. Doctorman 
Alan S. Mouritsen 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant Charles 
Schvaneveldt 
Ls/ L. Miles Lebaron 
L. Miles Lebaron 
Brian P. Duncan 
LE BAR.ON & JENSEN, P .C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
·r,, 
.,•'. 
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Isl Robert J. Fuller 
Robert J. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendant Still 
Standing Stablesf L. C. 
Isl Scott R. Edgar 
Scott R. Edgar 
Attorney for Defendant Cathy Code 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
submitted for electronic filing, and was thus sent to all counsel of record by 
email: 
Robert R. Wallace 
Kirton McConkie 
60 East South Temple # 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Robert J. Fuller 
1090 North 5900 East 
Eden, Utah 84310 
Scott R. Edgar 
1379 North 1075 West, Suite 226 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Gary E. Doctorman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this 3rd day of September 2014. 
October 04, 2014 08:30 AM 
/s/ Jessica Ritchie 
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EXHIBIT 4 
For-Sale-By-Owner Commission Agreement 
r- ..... 
·--•"" .... -·-•4.o"' IV.- ,.,..,,ua r-w~.., ""'..,..., -~-,,-
JAN-20-2006 FRI 11:50 Aft 
--• IV"'"• 
FAX NO. P. 07/08 
ra FOR SALE BY OWNER COMMISSION AGREEMENT & AGENCY DJSCLOSURE 
~ Thi:, is ?I !E>gatly bindir.g ~~ tfyou deBin> legal ortax adv!~ t:O!l5a1J yaur auorney ot tax wvisor. 
1. THIS COMMISSION AGREEMENT isenteted into on this 2.QllL.. day cf January, 2006 , betw~n Re/Max Ejite 
L)-l1,1Gll. ( Layton Branch } (the "Company"), indu<Slng nm Sh~a (Che "Age(lr) as the ai..1horized_agen~ for the Company, and 
~ t;e111/'AAJ.E'4'u,j#ihYck and C(lthv Code., {the ·seller") for real property owned by Seller described as follows: PaceL# 
23-006::QOOS t:JuotS\!me Ut 84310 ttne ·Properfy'"}. _ 
2. BROKERAGE Fl=E. The Seller agrees 1o pay lhe Company, irrespective crf agency relatiooshlp{s), as compensation 
for services, a Brokerage Fee in !he amount of$, _______ or;}% of the acqutsition price of thP. Property, if lhe 
Seller ~tieaJ.ltl an Off't}t from §mmett warren and Of Assiga§ {the "Buyer). or anyone acting on the BUyer's behalf, 
lo purch8$e or e,cchange 1he Property. The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be due and payable, from the 
proceeds of tt)e Seller. on the date ot reeortiing of ~8 documents for the purdla$e or exchange of the Property by the 
:.:,; Buyer or anyone actln9 on the Buyer's behalf. Ir the sale or exchange is ~te(f by default of the Seller, the BroL<erage 
Fee $ha1l lmmecfsate!y be due and payable 1D the Company. 
3. PROTECTION PERIOD. Jf within .§ months efter this Comruission Agreement is entered into. the Property is acquired 
by fhe Byyar, or anyone acting on the Buye(s behalf. the Seller agrees to pay the Company the BrO!<erage Fee stated in 
Section 2. The Seller agrees to exempt the Buyer upon entering intQ a vaUd 11$6ng agreement with ~nother Pl ol<.erdge. 
4. SELLER WARRANTil::siDISCLOSURf..!3. Th~ Seifer warront. that the indMctuali; or entity IISftd above as Uie "Seller" 
represents an of the record owners of ltle Pmpeyty. The Sellerwarrarns that it has marketable-title and a.n est::ahtistieo:I 
\JJ noht to seJ, li,ase. or exchange toe Property, The Seller agrees to e:xecukt the n8CQ££ary dnr,ument~ of conv&yanoc. The 
Setler agrses to furrtisf1 buyar Wllh good and mariu?table 1111a. and to pay at Settlement, for a S1:8ndard coverage owner's 
policy of title Insurance for the buyer in the amount cf the pumhase price.. The seller agrees to fu11y infonn ttJe Agent 
regarding the Sellers k:nnw~ge of the condition of the Property. 11n: Sell1tr agrees to personally complete ands.ion~ 
SAIIF,IJ'S Properiy Condition Oi3Closure form. . 
5. AGENCY RELATIONS1·HPS. By signing this Commission Agn:iement, tfl~ Seller acknowloog~ end egrees tnal U 1~ 
.Age, 11.ml'l 1hA Pfll'rcipal/Hranch Broker for the Company {tile -amkel"'} arc represring the Su~. As th& Buyer's Agent, 
...J they wlll act consistent with their fiduciary dlrtio:; to the Buyer of IOY'dlly. fUll 0ISdOsure, confidentiality, and reasonable 
care. TM SP.IIP..r ;:icknowledge~ lhot the Company and 11,e A.gant !'lave advised lhe Seller that tha ~!er is entiUed to be 
repreoentca by u r~al estate ayent that WIii represent the Sen er exclusively. Toe Seller has· however. elected not to b~ 
repr~ented by a rtal estate agent in thi$ ~on. The Seller further ackoowtedges and agrees that all actions of the 
Company and the Agent. even fhOSP. that assist lha Seller in perform1ng or completlng al'ly of the Seller's contractual or 
legal obli~tlon$. are Intended fur tile beneOt af me Buyar excluslVely. I his Commission Agreement ,;Joas nat require the 
Company or the Agent to solicit urrers on fJ\6 Property from 'lhe Buyer. nor does it a11thorize the Campany or the Agent to 
.; sotrclt offel'S f1om any otner person or entitv. 
" ii. PROt'ESS1ONAL ADVICE. ThA (:i;>mp~ny and tho /\gent are trained iu lhe maf'1(~ting ot real estate. Neither thP. 
company, nor- the Agent are trained to provide tfl43 S!.!ller or any pr0$pective buyer with legal or tax Rtlv\¢.la>, or with 
t9chnl~al advice rogorolng the physical wm:fflfon Df the fJroperty. If fhe Seller de1;~ ttdvioe regarding: {l) pa3t or pre$ont 
compllam;e wm·1 Lunir,g a11(f l)Uikf1ng code requirements: (ii) IA!Jal or taK matb:lra: (iir) tne physical rondiliun of tnQ Property; 
(IV) this Commission Agreement or {v) any ~nsaction for the acquisition of the Properly. the Agent and the Company 
STRONGI.Y RECOMMEND THAT THE saLER O0TAIN SUCH INDEPEN0ENI ADVICE:. IF THE SELlFR FAILS TO 
no so, THE SELLER 18 ACTING CONTRARY TO THE Al.>VfCE OF THE COMPANY . 
..:,ti) 7. orsrurr:: RESOLUTlON. Tne parties agree that any disputP., arising prior to or .after a closing rttlrJlad to tnls 
Cur111nlsSI0l'I Agreemertt. shafl first be submittlxl to mediation through fl mediation p1-uvlder mutually agreed t1pon by the 
parties. 1' the parti@.sr:anl'10t agree upon n modiotion providet, U1e cflspute shall be submitted to the ArnRrfoan Arbltr;lion 
A.ss0ci:;lti1>n • .Et<;h porty ug~ to bea1 its own costs of mediation. If mediation faJls, lhP. other procedures and remedies 
availnblc under this Ag1'81:!ment shall apply. · · 
8 . . ATTORNEY H::ES. Except ~s provided in Section 71 in any notion or proceeCling arising out ot tl'llt Commission 
Agreement inVDlving the Sellar;:irid/orthe Company, the prevailing party shaU b& E:l'ltilled to reasonable ilttomey fAP.s and 
'-.d costs. 
9. SELLER AUTHORIZATIONS. TIIe Comj:)any IS authorized lo disclose ~ftl:'!r dosing the final tcnns and ufes pric~ uf 
the Property to the following Mu[ti}'IIA , i~ting Service: Wasatch front Regional ML§ 
10. ATTACHMENT, There [ ) J\RE &cl ARJ:: :NOT addilional tamis to this Commission AgrAP.mi;>.nt. If MY~ff•, see 
Addendum ____ .... lncorporatt!d Into this Commission Agreement by this reference. 
11. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY. Seller and the CompRflyagree to c;omptyWlth federal, !3tab:1, and local fair 
11'.Jllliing Jaws, 
..J 12. FAXES. Facsimile (fax) b-ansmlsslor, of a signed copy o1 this Commis$4on Agreement. and retransmlsston of a sr9necl 
fax, shall be the sanie as delivery of an original. If lhls transaction involves mu1tiple awne~ this Commission Agreement 
may be executed In counte1 pctrts. 
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13, ENTIRE AGReEMENT. This Commission Agreement. includl,,g the Selte,.s Property Condition Disclosure form, 
contain the entire agreement between 1?\e pal1ies relating to the subject matter of this Commission Agreament. This 
Commlssicn Agreement may not be moolfied or amended except In w.nting signeQ by 1he parties hereto. 
~~NEP do hereby agree 10 the terms of-this Commission Agreement as of the date firs1 above Wr:ltten. 
(Seller's Sianeture) (Seller's Signature) 
Chuck and Cathy Code 
:~~ 
(Authon2:ed Agent} 
Tim Shea 
ay~-------~--(Princtpal/Branch Broker) 
M, Scott Quinney 
COl'YHll'.NTO UTAlU,$SOC14110N OF flE.41.TOR'Se• -zllllll l!SYJSED 7.8AW ALL lllGHTS Rl:Sl!RVED 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Real Estate Purchase Contract 
FAK NO, P, 02 
REALESTATiPURCHASECONTRACT--L.ANO 
· Thi$,. 11 ltgllll)' blndlnu c:cantraet. Ir you dr.llrll ,., ·or tax 1dvie•. C:0116\llt yo11r attorney Dl"1mrr Advisor, 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer Emmett Wa!n!Q aod Qt Assi9n.s offers to purchase the Property described below and hereby delivers to the 
Brokerage, 95 Eam~st Money, the emoant of~ in !he form of CHECK which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all 
· partlE!B _(as deflMd In Section 23), shall be d.eposlted In accordance with st.ate law • 
. Recelyed by: --=-~~~~--.-~:-""'~:--:::---~-.-~ on ________ .......,(Da:e} 
{S[llnolllr'O or111Jon~ 9Cknaw~ raceipi Ill EllffiDSI Monoy) 
.Brokerage: RefM~ E[~e l Layton Branch) Phone·Nizmber. 801-625-aZQQ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PRQPERTYl ~aod LLC, StU! Standing Stables also. described as: f:arcel # 23::Qll§-OOQ§ City of Humsvil~ 
· .County of--State ·of Ulah, ZIP ~ {the "Property"). · · 
1,1 lncltrdtd_~ms, (sPIJClfY) _______________________ _ 
1.2 Water Rlghta/Wat•r Sh1uea. The following water rights and/or W!Jtet share$ are included In the Purchase Price. ti----Shares of Stock In the · (Name of Water Company) {XJ ou,,r (specify) All rights attacl)ed to thQ propert.v and pr pertaining l9 the 12mperty.. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE The purchase price fer ih& Ptoperty is ~3625QQ 
ll'le purchase prie&wlll be paid as follows: · 
$.25.QQ_Q (1) Earneet Money Deposit. U11der certain conditions described in thh, Contract THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON~REFUNOABLE. 
$ _____ (b) Hew Loan, Buyer agrees to apply for. one or more of the following loans: 
r-,... · [X) CONVENTIONAL f J OTHER(specify} _____________ _ 
If the loan Is to Include any particular terms, then check below and give detaUs: 
,,,-..._ 
I l !P~CIFIC LOAN TERMS _________________ _ 
$ _____ (c) Seller Flnanoin9, (soi, attached Soller Finan I.Ing Addendum, if applicable) 
$ (d)Other(spaclfy). ____ ......, _________ ~------
$ (e) Balance uf Purchasa Prfca Jn Cash at Settlement. 
$436250Q PURCHASE PRICE. Toial 0flinaa (a) through (e) 
3. SETTLEMENT .AND CLOSING. Settlemenl shaft lak~ place on the Settlemimt Deadline referenced in Secllon 24(c), or 
on a d~te upon which Buyer and Seller agree in writing. -Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been 
compl~ted. (a) Buyer end Seller have signed and delivered 1o each olher Qr to the esc:row/closfng office all c{ocuments 
required by this Contract, by 1he Lendlllr, by written tJScliJW instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be 
paid by Buyer under these documents (except for 1he prt>ceeds of any new loan) have been delivered bY. Buyer 10 Seller 
or to the- escrow/cl<JSlng office in the form of c:ollocted or cleared funds: and (a) eny rnor'lles required to be paid by Seller 
. 1.1rider1hese docume~ have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the esc:row/c!Osing office !n the rorm.ofcollected or 
olearod fund.a. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (½) of tho fee charged by the eacrow/9loslng office ror its 
service& In the settlement/closing process. Taxes anq as8essment, for !his current year. rents, and Interest on 8$Sumed 
obligallo11$ shall bo prorated 11t Setllement as set forth ln Ihle Section. Proratlon:J iet forth in this Section shall be made as 
of tl'l& Settlement Deadline dale rtferen~cd In Section 24(c). unl&ss otherwise agreed to In writing by the parties. Such 
writing could lneJuda the settlement statement, The transaction wm be considered closed when Sottlemeot has been 
¢0mpleted, and when all o( the followfng have been completed: (l) the proceeds of any new loan.have been delivered by 
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office: end ~i) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded In the 
office of the county recorder. Ttie actions described in parts {I) and (II) of the preceding sentence shall be completed 
within four calendar days of Settlement · 
4. POSSESSION, Sallllr shall deliver physfoal possession to 8Uyf?r wltnln: [X] Upon Closing [ ] Other (spoc;lfy) 
S, C0NFrlRMATI0N OF A~~!_EISCLOSURE, At the signing of this contr-act: 
l J Seller's lnttlals ~yen tnrtla.ls 
Page1cf5page& SeUer'slnitials C.> · Dal.!!:; 2- 7,, c,(, 
~uyer's Initials ~ Date Z... ' • 0 G:» 
._:__,,; 
.-
u 
! 
i 
I 
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FEB-06-2006 MON 02:47 PM FAX MO. P, 03 
-~ 
.r'\ 
t.lsting Agent ___________ _. rapres•n~ r J Sellar { J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
· ·. · ·a! a .limlt~cf Agant; 
Lfstlng 13rokedor ____ _,. ______ _, represents { I Safier l ] Buyer I ] .both.Buyenintf'.Salter 
(Company Name) Ha _Llrlfltea·~glj.nt, 
· Buyer's· Agent Ifm Shea, repl'B5ents t J Setler [ J Buyer [ J beth Buyer and. Seller 
. as a Llmttod Agent; 
•Buv.ets Brokerfor Bcroax EOte ( Scott Quinney), replllsenla [ ]Sener [XJ Buyer l l both Buyer.andseiler:. 
· .(Cc:impany Name) ai a Llmlte,d ~gent: 
6, TITLE INSURANCE. Al _settlement. Seller agrees to pay for a .staridard--cov&rage owners pollc.v. of ~~-insurance 
lnsunng Svyer in the amount of the Purdlase Price. Any additlonal litle Insurance coverage shall be at auye-t'~~expQ_.nse. 
7, SELLER DISCLOSURES, No later than tne Seller Olsclos1,1re Deadline referenced In S~on 24(a), Seller shi!H41mvido 
to Buyer the folloWing daeU171snts Whieh are con·edtlVeJy referred to as the "Seller Disclosl.ll'Bs'': · · 
(a) 11 Seller propariy condition disclosure for the Pn:,perty, $lgned and dated by Seller; ✓ . 
(b) a commitment for the-poffcy of.title Jnsurance; 
• (c) a oopy of al)y leases P,ff09!1J'.'g the Property not expiring prlQr to Closing; 
, . ~- (d} written notice of.!lny ¢!alms ilnd/or con~itlo0$ !<flown td Seller relating to ~vironmol'llliiil probfems: 
· (e) evldtnce of any wqtet _tlghts..and/or water share& raferenrled In Section 1,2 aoove; lind · 
(f) ather(speeifvl----------------------------
8. 8U'fER1S RIGffT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer'a obligation to purchase-un'derlhls 
Contract (check applIQble boxet): · 
fa) [XJ 18 t ·1 rs NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Otsolo&ures referenced In 
Sedlon 7; · 
(b) [XJ JS f J IS NOT coadi~oned upon Buyer's approval of a physlail comfitlon Inspection of the Propef'tYi 
(c) I ] IS [X] JS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval afa survey of the Property by a l!Gensed liUrveyor: 
• (d} [XJ IS [ J IS NOT condiHon~ upon Buyer's approval of applicable federal, stats and Josal govemrnent.al laws, 
·oJtlinanc:as and reg1.1laUons j!ffecting tha Property: and any applicable deed f8Slrlctions and.for Cea.R's (covenants, 
conditions end restrfctions)'affecting the Property; -
(e) tx] IS [ J IS.NOT condl11oned upon the Property appraising for not fess than the Purchase. PricBi 
(0 IX] IS [ J IS NOT conditioned upon Buyet'& approval of the terms and condltlons of any mort(lage flnQncrng 
rafertnced in Section 2 above: · 
Cs) [XJ IS I J JS NOT conditioned upon Buyer'11 approval ofthefollOWlng tests end evah.1aUons ofthe'Pi'oporty: 
(specify) 
SQIIJut 
ff any of Items 8{a) through 8(9) are checked fn the affil'{TlaUve, then Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8,3 and B.4 apply; othetWiff, they 
do not apply. The Items .checked fn the affirmative above are 00llectlvely referred to as Buye('s "Due Di!l9&nce." Unless 
otherwise provld~d In this Contract, Buyer's Due Diligence shall be paid for by Buyer .end shall be conducted by 
lndlvlduals or entitles of ijuyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due Diligence. and with a final pT11•clos!ng 
inspection under Section 11, 
B, 1 Due DlflgsnGQ Deadline. No later than the Due 0lllgence Oeadlltie referenced In Section 24{b) Buyer shall: (a) 
cgmpfete aP or Buyer's Due DIiigence; and (b) detamiloe lfths results of Puyera Due Dfflg,1,noe are aecepllbleta 8uyer1 
8.2 Right to Cancel or ObJec:t. If Buyer determine$ that tne rasults of Buyer'a Due Dllfganca are unacceptable, Buyer 
may, no later than the Due Dlll51en~ Deatllltu,, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notlc~ to Seller, 
wheraupon the Eamest Money Depo&lt shall b& release~ tD Buyer, or (b) provide Seller with written noUce of obj&otlons. 
8,3 Failure ta Respond, If by the ~piratlon or the Due omgenoe DeadUne, Buyer cloas not: (a) cancel this Contract 
·as provided In Section 8.2: or {b} deliver a wrltten obJectlon to Seller rtgardlng the Suyer's Due DIHgence, The Buyer'$ 
Due DIiigence shall bit deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenetid in Sections B{a) throuah B(g), 
Including btJt not limited to, any financing contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer. 
8,4 Rosponsit by Sellor. Ir Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller &hall hav1a1 seven calendar 
days alter Seller's receipt of Buyer's objeotionll (the "Respon~ Period") in which to agree in writing vpon the manner e1f 
reeolvlng Buyer's objec1icne, Except as provided lri SQction 10.2, Seller may, but shall not l:)e required to, resolve, Buyers 
objectlonq, If Buyer and Sellar have not agreed ln writing upon the manner of resolving 8uyer's objection,;, Buyer may 
eancel this Contract by providing written notice lo Seller no later \ha n thre$ Ga!endar days af\er expiration of the Response 
P&rlod; whereupon the Earnest Mon~y Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract Is not i::ancsfed by Buyer under 
this Section B:4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. Thill waiVer shall not affect those Items warranted 
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in Section 1 O. 
9. ADDmONA1- TERMS. There [ ] ARe [ J ARE NOT addenda lo this ConlrBc:t c:ontalr.1tng_ addltlonal terms. 1f ,there ~re1 
the terma oflhe followlng addenda are Incorporated into this Contract by this reference: r J Adclenda.No.'s • . 
· [ J Seller Anancing A?dendum [ l other {specify) _____________ __,.. ___ _ 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES A~D ReJ'RES!!NTA'rlONS. 
111.1 Condition of Tit1a. $tller representi that Sellar has fee tlt!a to !he Property and will ctJnVe'/ good and mart<elabie 
title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed, Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Ptopert)' subject to lhe 
following matters or record: easements, deed restrictions. CC&R'a- (meaning crovenar.ts, eondlUc~s and raatrlctlo:1G~ and 
rights-of-way; and subJecl to the ccntents of the Commitment for Tttle Insurance as ag~d to by Buyer under Section 8. 
Buyer also agree5 to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Clcslng, 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeown&ra association dues, ulilltles, and o1her services 
provided to the Property after Closing. Seller will cause 10 be-paid off by Closing all mcrtgiiges, trust deeds, jisdgments, 
mechariio'.s liens, tax liens and wal'l'l!nts. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all a8$essn,ents and homeowners 
assoclaUcn dues. 
IF ANY PORTiON OF THE PROPERTY IS PRESE:Nn V ASSESSED AS "GREENBELT" (CHECK APPLIOA8LE 
BOX): 
[X) Se!LLEij .t J BUYER SHALL BE RESPONSU3LE FOR PAYMENT QF ANY ROL.L-BACK TAXl:S ASSESSED 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY. 
10.2 Condition of Prupe,tv. Seller warrants lhal the Prope,ty WIii be In the f0Uowln11 condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(4) the Property shall be free of debris and personal propertyj 
(I>) the Property wlll be In the same general condition ae It was on the date of Acceptance. 
11, FIHAL PRE-CLOSING INSPECT(ON, Before Settlement. Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable · 
time, cCll'ldl.lcl a final pre-closing lnspeetlon of the Property to determi11e only lhat the Property is •as represented: 
meaning thattne Property has been repaired/corrected es agreed to In Seclfon B.4, and is in the condition wananted i!l 
Section , 0.2. If the firoperty Is not as represented, Sellar wlU, prior to Settlement, repair/correct the Property, and place 
t~e Property In the warranted condition or with the consent of Buyer (and Lender ff appllcable}. escrow an amount at 
Settlement suffl~lent ti) provide for the same. The failure to ix>nduCI a final pre--closlng Jnspeetlon or to claim that the 
Property Is not as represented, shaH not consutute a waiver by Buyer of the rlghtto receive, on 1he date of possession, the 
Property ~~ rtprtaonted. · 
12. CHAflGES DURING TRANSACTION, Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closlng1 noae 
of 1he foHowlng Bheill occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) no changes In any existing leaaes shell be made; 
(b) no new leases snau oe entered Into; (a) no substantial alterations or Improvements to the Property shall be made-or 
undertakem and (d) no further financial encumbrances affecting 1he Property ;hal1 be made. 
13. AUTHORllY OF S(GNl:RS. If Buyer er Seffer Is a corporation, partr1er.1hlp1 trus,, estate. limited liability company or 
other entity, the per$0n exe,;:uting thi$ Contract on I~ behalf warrants his or her aulhotlty to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller, 
14. COMPLETE CONTRA.OT. This Contract together wltl, Its addenda, any attached exhibits, Bl\d Seller Disclosures, 
conatrtut~; the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, undarst&ndlngs or e0ntract& between Iha partle;. Th\$ Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement or me parties, 
16, DISPUTE RESOLUTIOH, The parties sgrtit that any dispute, arl&Jng prior to or after Clo&lng, related to this Contract 
(attack appllcabla box) 
I ]SRALL 
[X] MAY AT THE OPTION OF lllE PARTIES 
fif"$l be submitted to mc,dlation. If the parties agree 10 mediation, ths dispute shaft be submitted to mediation through a 
madlafion provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Esch party agrees to beer Its own costs: of mediation. If mediation 
rans, the ether procedure:. and rumedlas avallable untlerthls Contract shall apply. Nothing In 1hls Section 15 sh~l prohibit 
any p1uw from nelcing emergency eqult:ab!a relief pending mediation. 
16, DEFAULT. If Buyer derautts, Seller may elect enher to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated darm,ges, or to 
return It and su, Buyar to speoifically enforce thi5 Contract or pursue other remedies. available at law, If Sellar def11ults, lo 
addition to ratum of the Earnest Money Depos[t, Buyer may eleat eithor to accept from Seller a sum equar to 1he Earnest 
Money Deposit ~s liquldated demagea, or may sue Seller to epecifietilly enfor.:e this Contract or pureue other remedies 
avallable at law. If BJJyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agre~s to pay the liquidated dam~" to Suyijr upon 
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. ·. 11. AlTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In tne event of litigation or bi!lding arbitration to enforce ~is Contract, .the prevailing 
party shaff be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shaft not .be aw anted :ftli' pa111cipatlon 
in mediation under Section 1o. · 
: · . 1 a. NOTICE$, Except as provided In Sedlon 23, all noli~s required t1nderthis Contract must be: (a) In writil'\g; (b) )lgnea 
. •. · _.bythe·partygivlng r,1olice: and (c} recfiived by the otherpany or the otlierparty's a;ent no laterthan:tne _applJcabf&;date 
• .. , raferencea lh this ContracL 
19,.ABROGATION. Except for the provisions o(Sectlons 10.1, 10.2, 15 anc! 17 and exprest warranties-made 1n--thls 
bontract,,tne provisions of this COhtract shall not apply-after Closlng. · · · 
·20. RiSK OF L0ss;A11 r!Sk of I0$0s to the ProJl$rty, lncludtng physical damage or destnJetlan to the Property .or it, 
. lmprovemelll& due le anY cause exc:ept ordinary wear and teat and loss caused by a taking In eminent domain, sltall be 
· ... ·borne by Seller unill the transaction Is closed. 
. . .21. TIMe IS bF THE ESSENCE. Time ls of the·essence regarding Jhe dalet set forth in this Ccnt~ct. extensions ffllJ!it be 
ag~·-to In wrili119 by all patties. µnless otherwl$e expllcitly staled.in tills Conlract: (a) performance undereach_Secllon 
: .bf U,i1(Cantract 'l{hlch references a da1$ shalt ~l:i$.olutely be required btti:00 PM Mount¢n Time oh the steted .date:;and 
. · . · (b) the term 0days~ shlill mean .calendar days.and shall be Cl)Unted betjlnnlng on 1he day foDowlng the e~t :,ihf9h ~ggeni 
tlie tlml~g requirement (I.a., AcceptanCfll, etc.). PerformancD dates:and Umes referenced herein.shall not~~lnding:Upqn · 
:titl& c1:1mpanles,Jenders, apprailers and others not parties to this Contreet, excapt.as otherwise Jiareed to-In writing by 
. ·auch non-party, 
... ·.22 •. FAX T.RANSMISSJON AND COUNTERPARl'S, FacsimUa (filx) tra.nsmlssion of a s1$f\9d copy of thls..Contr.act, any 
· •. · _.. •addenda and caunt.erofferG, and the retransmission of sny signed fauh11ll be the sarn11 as -delivery. of arr original. This 
· · .:~ontract 811d i,ny addenda and counieroffers may be exeCUUMl.fn countfJrparts. · 
. 23. ACCEPTANCE, •Aooeptance" occurs when s~ner or Buyer. responding to an ofhir .or counteroffer.of the other: (a} 
•. :s!gris the offer or eountetofferwhere no~~ to Indicate accsptanc:e;.and {b) communii:ates to the other pari9·or to-tha.olher 
.. party's a11enttfiat the offer or_counten:iffGr has bi,en signed es ~eq"ulred. 
f'\. ·_;4.. _C0NTRAl:T DEADLINJ:S. Buyer and Seller agree that the foRoWing deadlines shall apply to .this Contract: . 
. . .
. ·. :·Ja)Sollerl:IJ,closure•D.eadlln& !i':"',J~ ~-W~tl'til,J ~flpY~€,, · (l;)llte) 
_.· .. lb} ~ue-DIH;t!Wlt 1>eadllna "'~ l>A-y 'oo ~ Wtt•TrlW Ate,t7fll't4Q5 (Dais) 
. 
... 
· ~ . Jc) S•tttemeint D.eadllno ,o t>Jtoxs. ~N:.Wf1 Tt!W .4a;:fPI'&ig(Dat•) 
. · ... ·: ~s. OFFER.AND.J™.E FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer,offirrs Co pun::hase 1he Property on the above-terms and col'ldit~s.:lf. : . ..-
.. :· .":.~1ter does not accept lhls offel' by: ,B:QO.· [ ] AM [XJ PM Mountain Time on JanuatY 2a, 2006 (Date), this Qffet'shall 
• . · )apse: and the Bibkerage mall rab.lm the Earnest Money Deposit tb Buyer. · 
..... ~ .... o 6 
--4liJWl~S11gnature) (Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Data) 
Ttta later of the above Offer Datea shall be referred to 11& Utt "Orrer Rararenca Data" 
Emmett Werrenand at 
AsslQDs · (Buyers' Names) (PU:ASE PRINT) (Notice Addresi) (Zip Code) {Phone) 
.. : 
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ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFERIREJECTION 
.CHECK O~E: . 
_. : :P.4 :ACCEPT.AN~!: OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the furtmclng offer .on the te,rr;s a,id conditions specified 
· :above. . 
. • ···I ] CO{!N:rEROFFE;R; Seller presents fer Buyer's Acceptane.e- the l.etrr.s:of i3uyer's off11r subject la th~ exceptions er 
· · •med": atlons as specified In the. attlehed ADDENDUM NO, ____ . 
'· . 
(time) (Seller's Signature) (Oata) (Time) 
----------- Z.f2-"M Die e~~6 ltw. 'S~ (WM' @J,S,9/, tffZ.~ 
(Sellers' Names} {Pl.EASE PRIHTI {Notice. Address) (Zip Code) (Phone} 
[ ] Rf:JECTIOI'(: SeUer teJects the foregoing offer, 
(Seller's SfanatlJre) (Date) (Time) (Seller"s Signature}_ (Cal&} rnme) 
UARFDJW1t 
,0 Page 5 cf S pagss Seller's lnitlals. _____ Date. __ ~-- Buyel'$ l~~ 
. ... 
